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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON TWO IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 
by 
Esmaeil Salem 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott J. Adams 
 
The main objective of my dissertation is to investigate some of the causal effects of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) on U.S. healthcare system. After an overview about some of the new 
provisions enacted by the ACA and their components and timelines, effects of the ACA on 
immunization coverage for children under age of three and its impact on retention of the insureds 
receiving newly established rebates would be assessed. 
Chapter 2 evaluates changes in the up-to-date status of the nine vaccines recommended by the 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for children aged 19 to 35 months 
following new provisions of the ACA that aimed to boost the coverage of the preventive 
services. By using a Difference-in-Difference identification strategy, I found that the ACA has 
significantly increased the number of up-to-date vaccines. In particular, it has boosted the up-to-
date status for DTaP, Hepatitis A, and Varicella vaccines, especially for the states without 
universal or universal select programs prior to the ACA. While results show that families with 
lower income have utilized more benefits in the case of Varicella vaccine, parents with higher 
income and education have utilized more benefits in the case of the Hepatitis A vaccine. Also, 
the ACA has been more successful for Varicella vaccine in the states where non-religious 
exemptions were not permitted by law. Although the ACA might have been effective for these 
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immunizations through eliminating the financial doubts for delays or refusals, since concerns 
about effectiveness and side effects of the vaccination have been reported as more important 
barriers, significant increases in the coverage should be seen as indirect information perceived by 
parents to address some of their non-price concerns.  
Chapter 3 investigates the changes in insureds’ retention rates once new rebate regulations under 
the ACA came into effect in 2011. By new provisions, if insurer does not spend at least 80% of 
the premiums collected from Individual Medical (IM) policies on claims and healthcare quality 
improvements, the left over should be returned to the insureds in form of the rebate. According 
to the literature, subjective value of the windfalls –like this rebate– could be different depending 
on how the recipient looks at the windfall. A rebate or returned wealth has a higher subjective 
value for the recipient than a bonus, and will more likely work as forced savings that convinces 
insured to stay with current insurer. Private insurance data used in the study shows that rebates 
have actually worked as a conventional rebate rather than a bonus, and have significantly 
discouraged insureds from lapsing, especially in the markets with fewer rivals. Also, larger 
amounts of the rebate show stronger impact on retention. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) or the so-called Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) or Obama-Care is a United States federal statute signed into law by President Barack 
Obama on March 23, 2010. As described by many of the professionals in the US healthcare 
system, it represented a significant change in the US healthcare system, encouraging or even 
forcing all US citizens to be involved in the health insurance market.  
The main purposes of the ACA are to increase the rate of health care coverage for Americans 
and reduce the overall costs of health care.
1
 In order to combat the market failure of adverse 
selection in a partially voluntary system of healthcare insurance, the ACA provides a number of 
mechanisms including mandates, subsidies, and tax credits to insurers, employers and individuals 
to increase the coverage rate. The ACA included numerous provisions to take effect over several 
years beginning in 2010.  
One of the ACA’s changes was to require insurance companies to deliver preventive services 
for free, starting from September 23, 2010. This includes all recommended vaccinations for 
children and adults. Section 2713 under section 1001, says:  
“ . . . a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at 
a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for: . . 
                                         
1
 For example, see 111th Congress Public Law 148, from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
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. (2) immunizations that have in effect a recommendation from the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  . . . .” 2 
In chapter 2, I estimate the effect of this new provision by measuring changes in vaccination 
coverage for children under three years old. Since some states have had provisions similar to 
what the ACA provided but prior to 2010, I will employ a difference-in-difference (DiD) 
approach to identify the effect of the ACA on coverage.  
Also, all private health insurance companies have faced a regulatory change by the ACA 
since end of 2010. Starting in 2011, the ACA requires insurance companies to submit data on the 
proportion of premium revenues spent on clinical services and health quality improvements, 
which is called the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR). Then, the ACA requires insurers to issue rebates 
to enrollees if this percentage does not meet minimum standards. Minimum MLR requirement 
for insurance companies is 85% for the Large Group (LG) plans and 80% for the Individual 
Medical (IM) and Small Group (SG) plans.  If an issuer fails to meet these minimum MLR, they 
are required to send rebates to their insureds based on contributions to the premium pool.  
In chapter 3, I investigate causal effects of the rebate, which works as a windfall gain that 
may send some signals towards insured regarding their expected payoff in next period, on their 
retention rate and lapse behavior. Since an exogenous policy determines rebate eligibility –
independently from insured’s characteristics, and only part of the population were eligible for the 
rebates, conditional independence assumption holds and therefore, causal effect would be 
measurable by gauging the difference in the lapse behavior of the eligible and non-eligible 
                                         
2
 U.S. Government Printing Office 
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insureds, after taking into the account the effects of the other covariates. So, a Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) identification strategy will be employed in this quasi-experimental analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
How Effective was ACA for  
Childhood Immunization Coverage in the United States? 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Since September 23, 2010, all health plans and insurance policies were required to provide 
coverage without cost sharing, such as deductibles, copayments, or coinsurance for childhood 
immunizations recommended by ACIP. In this chapter, I will use households (children) in states 
with ACA-type provisions prior to 2010 as a control group to estimate the causal effect of this 
provision on immunization coverage for children three years old or less in treated states, where 
parents experience a change in vaccination costs.  
From a social planner’s perspective, vaccination is one of the best examples of a positive 
externality leading to market failure, where the free market ends up in a lower than socially 
optimal level of production. Thus, the ACA is policy tool to combat the market failure.  
Although one avenue for this goal is through price reduction, vaccine demand is likely 
inelastic due to having no close substitute and a negligible share in household budget. Gust et al. 
(2008) have shown that cost of the vaccine was of importance for only delays in vaccination for 
Diphtheria, Tetanus and acellular Pertussis (DTaP) vaccine, which is among most expensive 
vaccines to complete. In order to explain significant increase in the coverage rate for the 4:3:1 
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vaccine series
3
 after state insurance mandates, Chang (2015) suggests that part of the population 
is still responsive to the immunization’s price which includes vaccine prices and time costs. 
More importantly, different copayment and deductible structures for different insurance plans 
hides the actual costs of vaccination for different families; therefore, results found in this work 
cannot be solely interpreted as the ACA’s impact through price elasticity.  
More to the point, the ACA likely makes coverage of vaccines more routine and may provide 
parents with more confidence against the side effects, too. Thus, I test the empirical hypothesis 
on whether the ACA’s new legislations about immunization affect overall coverage for 
childhood vaccines.  
This chapter continues as follows. Trends in childhood immunization will be discussed in 
section 2, followed by modeling and identification strategy in section 3. Data sources will be 
explained in section 4, and section 5 presents the results. I will try to find out the rationale behind 
the ACA effect on immunization in section 6.    
 
  
                                         
3
 4 doses diphtheria–tetanus toxoids–pertussis, 3 doses of polio, and 1 dose measles-mumps-rubella 
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2.2. Childhood immunizations in practice 
Immunization and childhood immunization in particular, have proven the idiom that “An 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”. A review published in 1999, for example, 
indicated that coverage of childhood vaccinations has resulted in more than a 95 percent decline 
in vaccine-preventable childhood diseases (Shefer et al. 1999). Also, Zhou et al. (2009) 
performed a cost-benefit analysis for full coverage of the same nine vaccines covered in this 
study – called routine immunization, and showed that the direct and societal benefit-cost ratios 
were 3.0 and 10.1, respectively. While their calculated incremental societal benefit-cost ratios for 
Hepatitis A (Hep A) and Rotavirus (ROT) vaccines were below one, meaning that they were not 
cost-saving, they indicate that these two vaccines are still cost-effective from the societal 
perspective. 
As of February 2011, ACIP recommended ten vaccines to be covered within the first three 
years of age for each child, nine of which are studied here.
4
 The timeline and schedule have not 
changed since 2008.  
During the past few decades, almost all countries have experienced vast success in bringing 
childhood immunizations to the forefront of preventive and public health policies. The Healthy 
People 2010 report, which covers the main objectives and goals related to public health in the 
United States for a 10-year horizon, indicates that substantial progress has been achieved for 
childhood immunization during the past decade in this country. Zhou et al. (2009) estimated that 
recommended immunizations by members of the 2009 US birth cohort prevented about 42,000 
                                         
4
 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, February 11, 2011.  
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early deaths and also 20 million cases of disease. Their estimation suggested net savings of $13.5 
and $68.8 billion in direct and indirect savings, respectively.  
Despite the seemingly obvious importance of childhood immunizations, take-up is still far 
from universal, and the reasons are diverse. Elementary, middle, and high school registration 
processes often mandate entrants to complete recommended vaccines or give explanation for 
exemptions, but there are no similar provisions for infants or preschool children. Doubts and 
concerns about vaccines’ necessity and safety, side effects, child illness, and not enough 
information about vaccination benefits have been the most important reasons for delay or refusal 
for childhood vaccinations (Gust et al. 2008, Benin et al. 2006). Gust et al. (2008) estimated that 
in about 5.9% of the cases, parents refuse to get all the vaccines due to different reasons while 
13.4% will delay. Varicella (VRC; chickenpox) vaccine has had the largest share of refusal in 
their study.  
Financial constraints are another possible explanation for delay or refusal. Kenyon et al. 
(1998) and Orenstein et al. (1990) found lower-than-average coverage within inner cities and 
public housings. In particular, Kenyon et al. (1998) found that African-American children 
throughout Chicago, and particularly those in public housing, are less likely to be vaccinated. 
Also, Gust et al. (2008) show that while very few parents had doubt or refused vaccines due to 
the cost, it was a little bit more important for delay in vaccination, especially for DTaP. Chang 
(2015) investigates the effects of the state mandates on insurance companies for infants 4:3:1 
vaccine series and found mandates as significant boosters for the coverage. She takes the 
proportion of the children vaccinated at hospitals or doctors’ offices into the account and since 
this portion increases significantly after the mandates, it suggests that some parents are 
responding to the lower overall costs of vaccination which include the implicit time costs.  
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Even with low price-elasticity, it is plausible to have some families foregoing to get shots on-
time due to the budget limitations, especially for vaccines with more concerns about side effects 
like VRC. A study by Joyce and Racine (2003) about the effectiveness of State Children’s Health 
Insurance Programs (SCHIP) in getting kids up-to-date for two series of vaccines and two 
individual vaccines showed that the program had been significantly effective only in the case of 
VRC. So, they argue that insurance coverage is of importance to adopt new vaccines like VRC. 
While their study did not cover PCV (Pneumococcal Containing Vaccine), they predicted that 
the importance of the insurance coverage is likely for more coverage for more expensive 
vaccines like PCV, too. A study by Abrevaya and Mulligan (2011) shows that state mandates on 
VRC vaccination prior to enter the school or daycare have significantly increased the vaccination 
rates among preschool ages of 19-35 months. They argue that these mandates could be affecting 
the coverage by raising public awareness about the vaccination benefits. 
As mentioned before, although new legislation is explicitly reducing the costs of vaccination, 
its indirect effects could be even more through providing more information and awareness to 
parents (Abrevaya and Mulligan, 2011) and reducing their concerns about the side effects.  
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2.3. Identification strategy 
 
2.3.1. States Affected and not affected by the ACA 
Immunization provision in the ACA has not affected all states equally. Some of the states 
have had similar regulations in effect even prior to the ACA. Figure 1 shows how 50 states and 
the District of Columbia were dealing with childhood immunizations as of September 2010. I 
updated the study of Rosenbaum et al. (2003) about legal framework for childhood immunization 
and found that prior to the ACA, 13 states had coverage mandate and cost-sharing prohibition for 
childhood immunizations, similar to the ACA’s regulations. These states play the role of control 
states in identification strategy.  On the other hand, 18 states did not have any mandate for 
insurance companies to cover immunizations as of 2010, and 20 jurisdictions did not have the 
cost-sharing prohibition with their coverage mandates. The ACA therefore has changed the 
regulation environment for these 38 jurisdictions, including D.C. which form treated—
affected—states. 
Figure 2 depicts trends in the up-to-date status of the nine childhood vaccines for affected 
and non-affected states from 2008 through 2012, based on National Immunization Survey (NIS) 
data. As I will explain later, only children with private insurance coverage through their parents’ 
employer are included. Along with trends for affected and non-affected states, I have included 
trend approximation for treated states if they would not had been affected by the ACA since 
2010 but had grown with same trend as control states. This is shown by dotted-dash lines. 
Indeed, I try to estimate the size and significance of the deviation from the trend (deltas on 
Figure 2). With a valid identification strategy, this deviation might be interpreted as a causal 
effect of the ACA. 
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One critique for this analysis about the ACA’s impact on vaccination coverage could be that 
is this really a change in vaccination coverage or a change in private insurance coverage? One 
can argue that effects shown here could come from changes in private insurance coverage –due 
to the ACA or anything else– and not changes in behavior of the parents. As Figure 3 shows, 
there have been parallel downward trends in private insurance coverage since 2008 in either 
treated and control states. Thus, the change in vaccination coverage could be attributed to causal 
effect of the ACA on parents’ behavior regarding vaccination, and not change in demand for 
private insurances. 
 
 
 
 
1
1 
Figure 1- Affected (Treated) States versus Non-affected (Control) States by the ACA Provision about Cost-sharing for 
Childhood Immunization
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States with coverage mandate and prohibition for both deductible and copayment in 2010: “Control Group” (13) 
States with coverage mandate, but silent about deductible/copayment or permitted deductible/copayment in 
2010 “Treated Group” [20 including D.C.]) 
States without any immunization coverage mandate for insurance companies in 2010 “Treated Group” (18) 
                                         
5
 For a comprehensive discussion, see Rosenbaum et al., 2003. 
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Figure 2- Trend of the coverage rates for nine of ACIP recommended vaccines in affected and non-affected states by the ACA, 
for children with ONLY private insurance coverage through parents’ employer 
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Figure 3- Trends of the private insurance coverage: overall, Affected states, and Non-
affected states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Estimation model 
I employ the following two estimation equations: 
                                                                           
                                                                                
While I estimate number of up-to-date vaccines for a child (       ) in Equation (1), I will 
estimate up-to-date status (     ) for each of the nine vaccines in Equation (2).       shows 
whether or not (1 or 0) the child i is up-to-date in receiving sufficient doses of shots for any of 
the 9 recommended vaccines at time t.     is the matrix of the child’s demographics and 
background such as parents’ education, parents’ age, parents’ income, child’s gender, and marital 
status of mother. Si is the state dummy variable,    is the time dummy,     is the dummy for 
treated group (equals one for children in treated states), and     is the dummy for the after-
25% 
30% 
35% 
40% 
45% 
50% 
2008 2009 2011 2012 
Overall Affected States Non-affected States 
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change period (equals one for years after 2010). Finally, since the policy change is expected to 
be exogenous to households (parents), the estimated  
 
 and  
 
 can be interpreted as the effect of 
the ACA on changing the probability of being up-to-date in terms of the number of vaccines or 
specific vaccine, respectively.  
Poisson and Logit models would be the most sensible approaches to fit the data for count and 
binary dependent variables in Equation (1) and (2), respectively. However, interpretation 
regarding magnitude and significance of the interaction terms is controversial in non-linear 
models, as has been shown in Ai and Norton (2003), Norton et al. (2004), and Karaca-Mandic et 
al. (2012). Indeed, magnitude and significance are both conditional on the independent variables, 
and sign of the effect could vary, even to be of different sign from the conventional estimated 
effect. There are two ways to deal with this. First, is to employ linear regressions whose 
coefficients are simply the marginal effects. This is what Abrevaya and Hamermesh (2012) 
called as Linear Probability Model (LPM) whose marginal effects are easily inferred. Currie and 
Gruber (1996) have used the same linear approach to evaluate effects of the public health 
insurance – like Medicaid – on children’s medical utilization and health outcomes. Since goal of 
this study is to investigate the causal effects of the ACA and not predictive modeling, this 
approach sounds easier and straightforward to make inferences. 
Second and more time consuming way, is to employ more complicated calculations to take 
the values of the independent variables into the account (Norton et al., 2004).
6
   
In this study, I will present Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results, whose details 
are presented in appendix Aʹ. Results from Poisson and Logit models can be found in appendix 
                                         
6
 inteff command in Stata is one of the technical solutions to get marginal effects for interaction terms. 
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A. Almost all coefficients from OLS regressions and significant coefficients in particular, have 
consistent significance with non-linear models presented in appendix A. In order to make sure 
about the accuracy of the size and significance of the effects found in Logit and OLS models, I 
have then revised all the estimated interaction terms in main models, model (2) and model (4) of 
Table 1, by employing more complicated calculations recommended by Norton et al. (2004). 
Results which are consistent with all significant results from OLS and Logit models are 
presented in Appendix B. Only these two models were chosen since running the command is so 
time consuming.  
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2.4. Data 
I use the NIS data from the 2008-2012 period, excluding 2010. NIS is a comprehensive 
dataset of the CDC that documents the immunization for all age cohorts. Each year phone 
interviews with parents of about 25,000 children are conducted. I include only children with 
private insurance through their parents’ employer, since families with complete or partial 
coverage of Medicaid or other federal and state insurance programs were less likely subject to 
the copayments and out-of-pocket payments even prior to the ACA. Of 104,230 children covered 
by these interviews in 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012, 43,833 (42%) had been covered only under 
private insurances and, thus, were subject to the ACA. Of those, 38,295 (87%) have complete 
information provided by their health providers.  I excluded children without health provider data 
due to significant number of invalid or missing information.  
NIS covers all 10 vaccines recommended by the ACIP.
7
 The NIS dataset includes up-to-date 
status for eight vaccines studied here, with only Hep A and influenza excluded. Up-to-date status 
for Hep A is calculated by author, using the recommendation schedule.  
                                         
7
 National Immunization Survey: A User’s Guide for the 2009 Public-Use Data File, December 2010, has counted 
the following for the up-to-date status of different vaccines:  
1. Diphtheria and Tetanus toxoids and acellular Pertussis vaccine (DTaP) – 4 doses;  
2. Poliovirus vaccine (Polio) – 3 doses;  
3. Measles/mumps/rubella vaccine (MMR-MCV (Measles-Containing-Vaccine)) – 1 dose;  
4. Haemophilus influenzae type b vaccine (Hib) – 3 or 4 doses depending on product type;  
5. Hepatitis B vaccine (Hep B) – 3 doses;  
6. Varicella zoster (chicken pox) vaccine (VRC) –1 dose;  
7. Pneumococcal vaccine (PCV (Pneumococcal-Containing-Vaccine))– 4 doses;  
8. Hepatitis A vaccine (Hep A), 2 doses;  
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2.5. Results 
 
2.5.1. Base model 
Model (1) in Table 1 summarizes the causal effect of the ACA – interaction of after and 
treated variables – after taking into account the effects of the covariates and adjusted for possible 
intra-correlations or clustered standard errors for observations within same state. The first row of 
Table 1 (and a more detailed Table A1′ in the Appendix) contains the regression results for the 
count of up-to-date vaccines. The ACA seems to have had a positive but marginally significant 
effect on number of up-to-date vaccines with a coefficient of 0.074 and p-value of 0.13. Results 
from Logit regression in appendix A1 show almost similar significance in outcomes. 
The next rows in Table 1 (and more detailed Tables A2′-A10′ in the Appendix) show the 
results for each of the nine vaccines studied. A glance shows that ACA has significantly boosted 
up-to-date status for DTaP and VRC vaccines. For other vaccines, ACA’s effect is usually 
positive but always statistically insignificant.  
 
 
2.5.2. Alternative models and robustness checks  
I next put the basic results of Table 1 through a series of robustness checks to account for 
potential non-similarity of treated and control groups, different legal and regulatory regimes, and 
causal effect among different segments of the sample. 
                                                                                                                                   
9. Influenza vaccine.  
10. Rotavirus vaccine (ROT) – 2 or 3 doses depending on product type.  
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2.5.2.1. Non-similarity of treated and control groups 
Any difference-in-difference estimation must establish the similarity of treated and control 
observations prior to the experiment to ensure the post treatment treated and control observations 
are not comparing apples with oranges. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is done here to 
minimize the possible differences between treated and control observations’ characteristics. 
Several studies suggest that combining PSM and DiD for repeated cross-section data results in 
even better performance than using either one (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000- Smith and Todd, 
2005). Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) suggests three times matching for each treated individual 
in after-change period: first, finding the matched treated in before-change period; second, finding 
matched control in before-change period, and finally, finding matched control in after-change 
period. 
Model (2) in Table 1 uses the closest neighbor without replacement method of propensity 
score matching to address this issue. For matching, I first estimate the relationship between child 
(family) characteristics and whether the child is within the treated or control group. This ensures 
me that families in the treated states will be compared to peer families in control states, in terms 
of the income, education, etc. Then, I try to match any child from the treated group with one in 
the control group with the closest propensity score. I assume that NIS surveys are representative 
for the population—treated and control—over time, so I skip the first step mentioned above. 
Therefore, I do the matching procedure once for observations before 2010 and once for 
observations after 2010.  
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Results of model (2) in Table 1 show that matching makes ACA’s effect on DTaP less 
significant but still positive while its effect on VRC becomes stronger. The overall effect of the 
ACA on the number of vaccines is still marginally significant and effects on other vaccines are 
still insignificant. 
 
2.5.2.2. Regulatory issues: Grandfathered status of insurance policies 
There is a grandfather clause on policies issued before March 23, 2010 that exempts them 
from many of the provisions in the ACA, including preventive services. The insured may retain 
their grandfathered status until a significant change in coverage happens. According to the to the 
Kaiser Family Foundation's Employer Health Benefits Survey in 2013, the percentage of covered 
workers enrolled in grandfathered plans have been 56%, 48%, and 36% in 2011, 2012, and 2013, 
respectively.  
Since grandfathered status can interrupt the effectiveness of the ACA provisions and makes 
problems for identification strategy, I argue that the effects found in this chapter are the lower-
bound effect of the ACA on immunization, as some portion of the policies has not experienced a 
real change by the ACA due to their grandfathered status.  
One possible way to address this issue is to use only 2012 as the after-change period. Model 
(3) in Table 1 shows the estimations using only 2012 for the after-change period along with the 
matching procedure. However, since the diminishing rate of the grandfathered status was very 
slow and we lose half of the data for the after-policy change period, i.e. 2011, standard errors 
doubled in most cases and all effects became insignificant, except of the effect of the ACA on 
the VRC vaccine which is still statistically significant.  
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2.5.2.3. Legal differences: Universal Purchase and Universal Select Programs8  
The majority of states depend primarily on federal resources to purchase vaccines. However, 
some states add their own programs to supplement these funds. As of 2010, six states (NH, NM, 
RI, VT, WI, and WY) had Universal Purchase programs where the state purchased all 
recommended vaccines for all children, including those who are fully insured. Six other states 
(AK, HI, ME, MA, SD, and WA) had Universal Select programs that purchase all recommended 
vaccines for all children with the exception of one or more vaccines. Once the vaccines are 
purchased, they are distributed to all public and private providers, who may charge an 
administration fee. Although cost is not considered as main driver of the results, having only an 
administration fee instead of the full price of a vaccine means lower effective price of the 
vaccine in the above-mentioned states, which may have impacts on identification strategy.  
Excluding Hawaii and Wisconsin which were in control states, 10 out of 12 states mentioned 
above were in the treated group. I exclude those 10 from the treated group to observe more clear 
effect of the ACA in model (4) of Table 1. As expected, it shows a stronger and more significant 
effect of the ACA on the number of up-to-date vaccines, and in particular on the DTaP and VRC 
vaccines.  
To check the results against non-linear estimation recommended by Norton et al. (2004), I 
estimate interaction term based on the independent variables which is shown in set of figures B2 
in the appendix B. These figures show that magnitude and z-stat of the interaction effect vary by 
                                         
8
 Information regarding these programs has been obtained from: National Conference of State Legislatures, 
“Immunizations Policy Issues Overview”, April 2011. 
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the values of covariates, which finally enables me to calculate average magnitude and average 
significance of interaction effect (term “ie” on the graphs) for whole population. Using this 
method, for example, results in average marginal effect of 0.0313 for interaction term (the 
ACA’s impact) for DTaP in model (4) of Table 1, where estimated coefficient was 0.019 for 
OLS. I prefer to refer to OLS results as marginal effects since they come from model and not 
simply taking average of the effects found for all individuals. Based on model (4), therefore, the 
ACA has increased the up-to-date status of both DTaP and VRC by about 2 percentage point. 
 
2.5.2.4. Legal differences: Vaccination Exemption Permissions9  
States have different approaches regarding exemptions from vaccination requirements for 
schools and preschool daycares which could be another source of variation among different 
states.  
As of 2012, all states were permitting medical exemptions which are essentially difficult to 
achieve. Also, all states except Missouri and West Virginia were permitting religious exemptions 
for immunizations. Both Missouri and West Virginia are among our control states, so they do not 
have any corresponding treated state. On the other hand, there were 19 states who were accepting 
philosophical, conscientious, and personal belief exemptions in addition to religious exemptions: 
AZ, AR, CA, CO, ID, LA, ME, MI, MN, MO, ND, OH, OK, PA, TX, UT, VT, WA, and WI. 
Out of the 19 states mentioned above, 5 states (AR, MO, OK, TX, and WI) are in our control 
group and 14 are in treated states. In order to have more clear impact of the ACA on childhood 
                                         
9
 Information regarding this topic has been obtained from: National Conference of State Legislatures, 
“Immunizations Policy Issues Overview”, December 2012. 
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vaccination, I have excluded all 19 states above from my sample in model (5) of Table 1. This 
assures me that nothing other than the ACA has caused a change in coverage rate. Since I have 
lost significant portion of the observations, standard errors become larger and significance of the 
estimates observed in model (4) goes away. The only exception is Varicella vaccine whose 
coefficient became larger while still significant at 95% confidence level. 
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Table 1- Estimation of the ACA effectiveness to boost the coverage of nine recommended 
vaccines for children aged 19-35 months under private insurance coverage in OLS 
regressions (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base 
model 
Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Effect of the ACA on  
number of up-to-date vaccines 
0.074 0.079 0.032 0.107* 0.027 
(0.048) (0.058) (0.082) (0.059) (0.066) 
Effect of the ACA on  
DTaP vaccine 
0.013* 0.016* 0.008 0.019** 0.014 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) 
Effect of the ACA on  
Hep A vaccine 
0.018 0.019 0.013 0.022 -0.011 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.027) 
Effect of the ACA on 
 Hep B vaccine 
0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) 
Effect of the ACA on  
Hib vaccine 
0.003 -0.005 -0.017 0.011 -0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) 
Effect of the ACA on  
MCV vaccine 
0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.009 0.007 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) 
Effect of the ACA on  
PCV vaccine 
0.003 0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.016 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) 
Effect of the ACA on  
Polio vaccine 
-0.001 0.004 -0.008 0.006 0.001 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) 
Effect of the ACA on  
ROT vaccine 
0.017 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.009 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.029) 
Effect of the ACA on  
VRC vaccine 
0.015** 0.020** 0.018* 0.019** 0.036*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but 
after propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) 
but only 2012 for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after 
eliminating 10 states with Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but 
after eliminating 19 states with legal exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models. For list of variables, see tables A1-A10 in the appendix. 
c. 
*
 p < 0.10 , 
**
 p < 0.05 , 
***
 p < 0.01
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2.5.3. Differences among different segments of the sample 
Almost all the regressions in Tables A1-A10 and A1′-A10′ in the Appendix show that a 
family’s income-to-poverty ratio and the education of the mother were quite important and 
strongly significant in explaining the behavior of parents. From another perspective, the ACA 
might affect parental choice about vaccination through change in cost-sharing mechanism, or by 
addressing some their concerns about vaccines.  For example, vaccines with more safety 
concerns might gain increased coverage because parents who were not potentially choosing to 
vaccinate their children prior to the ACA are now receiving more information and incentive to 
follow the recommendations. Thus, I split the sample into two subsamples to study the 
effectiveness of the ACA in detailed subsamples.  
Model (1) in Table 2 replicates results of model (1) in Table 1. I picked model (1) as base 
because there are few number of observations in the segment with below 300% poverty line 
income which results in even fewer observations and higher standard errors after matching 
process. Then, I split the sample into two subsamples: families with income of 300% or more of 
the poverty line and families with income of 300% or less of the poverty line. On average, 30% 
of the families have had less than 300% of the poverty line. Models (1-1) and (1-2) in Table 2 
show the results for each segment. They indicate that while the ACA has shown more success 
with families with lower incomes for VRC, it has been more effective for higher income families 
in the case of the Hep A vaccine.  
Due to positive correlation between parents’ education and income, once I split the sample 
based on the mother’s education, similar trends in the utilization of this new provision is 
observed, as expected.  
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Table 2- Estimation of the ACA effect on nine recommended vaccines, for subsamples 
including children in families with income below/above 300% of poverty line in OLS 
regressions (SE in parentheses) 
 
(1) 
Subsamples depending on family’s income 
Model # 
Subsample of children in 
families with income  
< 300% PL 
(1-1) 
Subsample of children in 
families with income 
 >= 300% PL 
(1-2) 
Effect of the ACA on  
DTaP vaccine 
0.013* 0.013 0.008 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) 
Effect of the ACA on  
Hep A vaccine 
0.018 -0.028 0.037* 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.022) 
Effect of the ACA on 
 Hep B vaccine 
0.001 -0.004 0.001 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) 
Effect of the ACA on  
Hib vaccine 
0.003 0.014 -0.007 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) 
Effect of the ACA on  
MCV vaccine 
0.005 0.009 0.002 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) 
Effect of the ACA on  
PCV vaccine 
0.003 -0.015 0.008 
(0.006) (0.016) (0.008) 
Effect of the ACA on  
Polio vaccine 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) 
Effect of the ACA on  
ROT vaccine 
0.017 -0.001 0.024 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025) 
Effect of the ACA on  
VRC vaccine 
0.015** 0.030*** 0.006 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Note: a. All models with clustered standard errors for states.  
b. There are other variables in the models. For list of variables, see tables A1-A10 in the appendix. 
c. 
*
 p < 0.10 , 
**
 p < 0.05 , 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
  
 26 
 
2.6. Discussion  
Number of up-to-date vaccines: The ACA has been successful in boosting immunization status 
for children aged 19-35 months, especially for families living in states without 
universal/universal select programs prior to the ACA. Although the effects typically fall just 
below conventional levels of statistical significance, the consistent positive impact across models 
suggests a positive impact is likely. 
DTaP and VRC: The ACA appears to be successful for these two vaccines. All estimates in 
Table 1 are statistically significant for VRC, and in the case of the DTaP, only estimates in 
model (3) and (5) are statistically insignificant. The ACA’s impact has almost been doubled on 
VRC in states without non-religious exemption permissions in model (5) of Table 1. To check 
this, I limit the treated sample to those states with non-religious permissions and positive impact 
of the ACA on VRC disappeared. This means that the ACA has not been successful to boost 
VRC’s coverage in the states where non-religious exemptions are allowed. In terms of policy 
implications, the ACA has not provided enough informational support to address the concerns 
regarding VRC vaccine. However, wherever vaccination had more restrictive regulations, the 
ACA has shown more successful to close the gap.  
In summary, OLS results show that the ACA has increased the up-to-date status of DTaP by 
1.6-1.9 percentage point while the increase has been about 1.9-3.6 percentage point for VRC. 
Furthermore, the segmented models in Table 2 verify that VRC has experienced higher 
coverage among families with lower incomes, who reacted significantly to the policy change 
where the ACA has raised the up-to-date status by 3 Percentage point. For DTaP, on the other 
hand, both subsamples have shown positive and marginally significant response to the ACA.   
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Hep B, Hib, MCV, PCV, POL, ROT: The ACA has no observable effect for these vaccines. 
Other than a few negative but insignificant coefficients, the majority of the estimated effects 
were insignificantly positive. The marginally significant effect of the ACA on PCV vaccine for 
families with higher incomes in Table 2 is not enough to conclude a successful outcome, as it is 
not stable and changes with minimal change in the segmentation procedure. 
Hep A: At first glance, Table 1 showed that ACA was not statistically successful for this 
vaccine. Once I split the sample into segments in Table 2, however, it reveals a significant effect 
of the ACA on families with higher income and higher education. OLS model in Table 2, for 
example, shows that the ACA has increased the up-to-date status of Hep A by 3.7 percentage 
point for the high-income segment while it was insignificantly negative for low-income segment.  
 
2.6.1. Possible explanations 
As I mentioned earlier, demand theory suggests very low price elasticity for vaccines. From 
empirical perspective, on the other hand, we do not have clear information about incurred 
vaccination cost for each family. So, I just know that cost could be one of the potential barriers 
for up-to-date coverage of vaccines (Orenstein et al., 1990). Cutts et al. (1992) and Shefer et al. 
(1999) noticed that cost effectiveness is one important element of "perceived barriers" of 
children’s immunizations which may result in delay or refusing childhood vaccination.  
Gust et al. (2008) show that few cases of delays or refusals were contributable to costs. In the 
study, vaccination refusal due to the costs was only observed in the case of VRC while DTaP has 
had the highest number of delays due to the costs. This suggests that cost of vaccination is still a 
minor concern. Looking at the costs of different vaccines shows that DTaP is the third most 
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expensive vaccine to complete, after PCV and ROT vaccines.
10
 Therefore, among three 
successful vaccines mentioned above, highest price reduction due to the ACA has occurred for 
DTaP vaccine.  
On the other hand, opportunity costs of not getting the vaccine could be even more important 
than its direct and explicit costs. There are several studies focused on indirect individual and 
societal savings of vaccinations. The probability of hospitalization and its costs in case of illness 
by vaccine-preventable diseases are different across vaccines. In a study, Zhou et al. (2009) have 
estimated costs related to vaccine-preventable diseases. According to their study, DTaP has the 
highest probability of hospitalization (almost 100%) and highest costs per hospitalization, too. 
These facts suggest that the ACA could potentially reduce costs of vaccinations for DTaP such 
that no delay happens due to the costs as was reported in Gust et al. (2008).  
Cost is not the only barrier against full coverage. As mentioned before, there are concerns 
about necessity, and also about safety and side effects of vaccination which play much more 
important role than costs. According to Gust et al. (2008), ranking the total number of children 
with vaccination delay or refusal due to safety and side effect concerns, VRC with 69 cases 
would be in first place, followed by DTaP (32). Ranking with respect to the total number of 
delays and refusals due to doubts about vaccination effectiveness puts VRC with 55 cases at the 
top, followed by Hep B with 10 cases. Unfortunately, Hep A and ROT have not been covered in 
their work. 
                                         
10
 Based on CDC vaccine prices per dose, for private sector, and for single vaccines list, updated on June 3, 2014: 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/awardees/vaccine-management/price-list/index.html 
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More importantly than cost reduction, the ACA could arguably be successful by spreading 
the information and support regarding safety and effectiveness of the recommended vaccines. 
From another perspective, combining cost reduction and indirect information perceived by 
parents regarding their non-price concerns might have affected parents; especially those who 
were undecided but just on the border. My results show that in states where non-religious 
exemptions was not allowed, effect is stronger, suggesting that the ACA has helped to convince 
concerned or undecided parents to get immunized.   
In the case of Hep A, low coverage rate could be the answer to the reason of the success. We 
saw vaccination coverage rates for both control and treated groups in Figure 2. Although trends 
for both groups look similar, Hep A and ROT have had substantially less than an 84% coverage 
rate, which is the floor coverage rate for other vaccines. This relates to the fact that CDC 
recommended these two vaccines only recently.
11
 Hence, I may consider ACA as a catalyst to 
expand the coverage for Hep A for all families, rich or poor, but more educated parents took 
more advantage from the ACA. But why ROT does not follow the same way? According to 
Zhou et al. (2009), while probability of hospitalization is 0–100 percent for Hep A with 
$11000–$33000 cost of hospitalization, these values are 0.5–3.8 percent and $3000–$4000 for 
ROT, respectively. However, vaccine’s cost is less than half for Hep A. Therefore, one could 
argue that the ACA did not still magnify the benefits and reduce non-price concerns so much in 
case of the ROT vaccine to be significantly observable in data. 
Another explanation for effectiveness of the ACA on coverage rate could be combination of 
the vaccines. The possible combinations of the vaccines include DTaP-POL (Kinrix), DTaP-Hep 
                                         
11
 CDC schedules of recommended vaccines show that Hep A was added in 2006, and ROT was added in 2007. 
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B-POL (Pediarix), DTaP-POL-Hib (Pentacel), Hep A-Hep B (Twinrix), Hib-Hep B (Comvax), 
and MCV-VRC (Proquad). Since DTaP and Hep A vaccines are combined with other vaccines 
whose coverage rates did not change due to the ACA, this explanation does not sound relevant 
for their boosted coverage after the ACA. However, in the case of VRC, we know that it is 
almost always offered individually. While combinations of MMR (MCV) and VRC vaccines are 
possible as indicated above, but some studies, such as Klein et al. (2010), have concluded that 
this combination may increase safety risks. Therefore, vaccines combinations cannot provide 
additional explanation for the impact of the ACA on coverage rate.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Effect of the Rebate on Insured’s Retention Rate  
 
An Applied Study  
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Insurance industry in general and health insurance in particular, used to be categorized as a 
screening game in economics literature. Due to asymmetric information between insured and 
insurer, with less information about health conditions for the latter, the insurer tries to provide 
different options so that the insured self-select themselves into most appropriate product for their 
health conditions. Deductible, copayment, coinsurance, maximum out of pocket payment, and 
maximum lifetime payment are all examples of the options insurers use to enforce insured to 
self-select themselves according to their better-than-insurer known health conditions.  
Since 2011, the ACA has added minimum MLR provision to the health insurance 
regulations. If an insurance company does not meet the minimum MLR of say 80% for 
Individual Medical (IM) policies, the left over should be sent back to the insureds, based on 
insured’s contribution to the total premiums collected.  
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To calculate MLR, an insurer takes the sum of claims plus payments for healthcare quality 
improvement activities, divided by premiums less taxes and other regulatory fees. Of course, 
MLR calculation is done in aggregate and on a state-by-state basis for each line of business –
large group/small group/individual medical insurances.
12
 Therefore, eligibility to receive the 
rebate is determined based on all the premiums and claims submitted in a state and market 
combination, and not by an individual policy. Therefore, rebate eligibility and amount are not 
controlled by insured. Once the MLR calculated for each of the lines of businesses in a state
13
, 
the rule of 80 or 85 percent may result in rebate eligibility for some of the insureds.  
The goal of this study is to investigate the causal effects of the rebate on the lapse behavior of 
the insurdes. Therefore, in this case, investigation is around the insured’s reselection among 
different alternative insurers in the market rather than self-selection according to different 
available insurance options. So, the decision turned to be whether or not to stay with current 
insurer for another year or month, i.e. retention, after rebate distribution. 
Apparently, insurance rebate puts some windfall gains in the pocket of the insured. 
According to several studies, windfall gains could be used for consumption or saving, depending 
on whether the recipient views the windfall as a bonus or returned wealth. This study, however, 
aims to find out causal effects of the rebate on insureds’ lapse behavior. While price and quality 
                                         
12
 For a good and comprehensive discussion about MLR regulations under PPACA, see “Early Effects of Medical 
Loss Ratio Requirements and Rebates on Insurers and Enrollees”, United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), July 2014 
13
 There are more details and some exceptions for MLR calculation. For example, insurers with small number of 
enrollees can make certain adjustments to their MLR. For complete details see GAO report of July 2014 as indicated 
above. 
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of the services are still the most important determinants of the insured’s demand for insurer’s 
services, rebate may play an important role in insured’s renewal decision based on her perception 
of the received windfall gains, like what was mentioned for consumption/saving decision. If the 
windfall gains are viewed as a rebate or returned wealth, it will more likely work as forced 
savings where the insured might be more inclined to stay with current insurer as opposed to look 
at that as a one-time bonus which looks like a noise and does not make any change in her lapse 
behavior. Thus, the question would be whether or not the inured views the received rebate as a 
rebate or bonus.  
Lapse/stay decision is, however, different than consumption/saving behavior in some aspects. 
First, insurance rebate is less determined by insured’s self actions, and is basically based on the 
overall risk of the insurance pool. Also, some other important factors like number of alternative 
insurers in the market may impact the insured’s perception and decision, too.  
From empirical perspective, since eligible insureds have been subject to an exogenous policy 
change (rebate eligibility) and due to the independence of the rebate eligibility and 
characteristics of the insured, any change in the behavior of policyholders could be attributed to 
the causal effect of the policy change. Since only part of the population became eligible for the 
rebates, the causal effect could be measured by gauging the difference in the lapse behavior 
between eligible and non-eligible insureds, after taking into the account the effects of the other 
covariates. Thus, I employ a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) identification strategy by using 
rebate recipients as treated group and non-recipients as control group in this quasi-experiment. 
 34 
 
This chapter continues as follows: Section 2 includes literature review and expected 
outcomes. In section 3, I will explain about data and feasible identification strategy. Results are 
presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes the discussion.  
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3.2. Backgrounds 
 
3.2.1. Income timing/unexpected income 
There are several studies about the effect of the change in timing of the income or 
unexpected income on behavior of the consumers. Shapiro and Slemrod (1993), for example, 
have studied the effect of reduction in tax withholding in 1992 on consumers’ behavior. They 
found that timing of the income did really change the consumption behavior, in contradiction to 
permanent-income/life-cycle hypotheses, but substantially less than one hundred percent aimed 
by policy-makers. Also, Jones (2010) explains why taxpayers do not utilize gains from the 
change in federal tax withholding in 1992. He adds inertia as another explanation for negligible 
change in withholding in response to the change in regulations, in addition to precautionary 
behavior and forced saving motive explanations. 
On the other side, effects of the unexpected incomes –windfalls– on consumption path have 
been subject of numerous theoretical and applied studies. In an experimental study, Arkes et al. 
(1994) provide psychological explanation for consumers’ behavior regarding windfall gains. 
They propose two different curves for objective dollar amount of the income and subjective 
value of that. Conclusion is that subjective curve changes when income is perceived as windfall 
gain instead of regular income, resulting in higher spending rate out of windfall gains. In an 
effort to explain different consumption patterns for bonuses versus rebates, some studies have 
compared additional income with someone’s current wealth, called difference in income framing 
or description of the income. They distinguish between objective and subjective gains from 
income and argue that consumers see the rebate as a returned loss from previous wealth state in 
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contrast to a bonus as a gain from current wealth state. Therefore, they predict larger spending 
from bonuses in comparison to the rebates (Epley et al. (2006) - Epley and Gneezy (2007)).  
Billions of dollars tax rebates related to the federal government fiscal policy in 2001 
provided a good real experiment for effect of the windfall incomes on consumption. Several 
studies have focused on this change and most found that the change in consumption was much 
lower than expected, like what Shapiro and Slemrod (2003, 2009) found, which can be explained 
by above theories.  
Although all mentioned theories and experiments focused on the consumption path out of the 
windfall gains received by a person, this study focuses on testing whether insured views the 
rebate as a returned wealth or forced saving which creates a tendency towards staying with 
current insurer and likely receive another rebate next year, or as a one-time bonus without a 
significant impact on the lapse rate. Basically, if the insured sees the rebate as a gain from 
previous wealth state, the subjective value of this forced saving would be higher than if it was 
seen as a gain from current wealth state, i.e. a bonus. Therefore, higher value of the perceived 
change in wealth in first case may incentivize the insured enough to affect her stay/lapse 
decision.   
In addition to the insured’s perception regarding the rebate, there are some other important 
variables that may affect insured’s expected rebate in next period once she receives the rebate in 
current period, and thus, encourage/discourage her to keep the policy. In next section, I will 
propose some of the expected changes in the behavior of the insured, after receiving the rebate.   
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3.2.2. Expected outcomes 
In order to predict the behavior of the insured, I consider all parameters with possible impacts 
on insured’s decision regarding stay/lapse. Rebate eligibility, health insurance market 
concentration, rebate frequency in the market, and rebate amount are the ones I can imagine with 
potential impacts on the lapse behavior. 
Rebate eligibility: Obviously, this is the most important and most relevant variable affecting 
insured’s lapsing behavior. While the argument that rebate may keep the insured hopeful for the 
next rebates is still in place, it might be argued that rebate sends information that insurer services 
were originally overpriced. However, since the services –including doctors’ network, drug 
coverage, etc– was selected by the insured in the past, the rebate is more to incentivize one to 
stay with the company to continue to receive the financial return. Therefore, I expect to see lower 
lapse rate for those received the rebate.   
Insurance market concentration: Count and availability of alternative insurers in the market 
may impact decision of the insured for next period’s enrollment as well. In more concentrated 
markets where searching and switching cost goes up due to less available alternatives, the policy 
is more likely to be kept. On the other side, more alternative available in more competitive 
markets might still convince insureds to switch, even after receiving new information –rebate; 
especially if I consider the positive relationship between market competition and rebate 
frequency which comes later.  
Rebate frequency in the market: Once insured receives the rebate, s/he looks around to see 
how popular rebates are. Less frequent rebates results in stronger incentive for the insured to stay 
with current insurer. For example, if rebate receiver sees that almost everyone else has received 
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the rebate too, there would be the same likelihood of the rebate for the next year regardless of the 
insurer. Therefore, I expect to see positive relationship between lapse rate and rebate frequency 
in the market.     
Rebate amount: Beside the rebate eligibility, its amount indicates the worthiness of taking 
this new information into the account once revising stay/lapse decision. Apparently, negligible 
rebate should have no impact on decision while larger rebates –especially if it can be expressed 
as proportional to the paid premium, increase the chance of staying with the same insurer.  
There are other variables which generally have influence on the retention which should be 
included in the model like policy duration, age of the head of the policy, number of lives under 
the policy, etc. Next, I will discuss about availability of the variables described so far and how to 
prepare the data for analysis.   
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3.3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Data  
I have used data on Individual Medical (IM) health insurance policies from one of the private 
health insurance companies in the US that were subject to the minimum 80% MLR regulation.
14
 
Data contains information about demographics (gender, age, number of lives under policy, and 
state), insurance policy (channel, product type, deductible, policy class, preferred, rating, and 
adverse action indicators, duration, rebate amount, and exposure
15
), and lapse indicator for any 
month between January and October, 2012. I will explain later that I add an indicator for 
competition level in IM insurance market within different states to measure the market power of 
the insurer and concentration in the market.  
Although I have 140,702 policies during this 10 month time window with lapse exposure, 
only 118,243 of those were initiated on or before January 2012, i.e. policies that were potentially 
eligible for the rebate, based on 2011 performance. Since goal is to figure out effect of rebate on 
lapse rate, I only include policies. About 30% of these policies received the rebate in 2012. Table 
3 shows summary statistics for this sample.  
                                         
14
 Insurer has only provided a subset of the data for research purposes. Disclosure of the name or data of the insurer 
is prohibited. Data provided by insurer is not representative for the complete dataset and thus, results are neither 
necessarily in the line with true results, nor under approval of the insurer. 
15
 Exposure indicator shows whether or not the policy is eligible to lapse within that month. For example, partial 
month enrollment is not possible at the beginning of policy initiation so that policy cannot be terminated within the 
starting month for partial enrollment.  
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Table 3- Summary statistics of the sample 
Number of policies initiated on or before January 2012 118,243 
Average number of lives under policy 1.77 
Average age of primary policyholder 45.02 
Average duration (month) 43.19 
 
I also include information about the rate of competition in the market and rebate frequency in 
the market, both calculated at the state level, which will be explained later.  
 
3.3.2. Identification Strategy 
Although a linear or non-linear regression of the binary choice variable of Lapse (0/1) as a 
function of the explanatory variables explained so far is an option, there are two main concerns 
about this approach: First, the coefficients, including the one related to rebate eligibility, just 
show the correlation between lapse and explanatory variables, without any logical causality 
inference. Secondly, although rebate eligibility is based on the market’s risk pool in state level, it 
is not completely independent from policyholder’s characteristics. For example, correlation 
coefficient between rebate eligibility and renewal month of the policy (rn_on_ind) or duration 
are 0.3 and 0.2, respectively. This means that there could be some unobserved characteristics of 
the policyholder –which are accumulated in error term– that may have correlation with rebate 
eligibility. This does not comply with the assumption for independence between covariates and 
error term, resulting in biased coefficients.  
In order to deal with above mentioned concerns, I attempt to simulate a semi-randomized 
experimental analysis based on available information. Then, I address the second issue by 
matching observations based on their backgrounds. 
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Since rebate is an exogenous change to a policyholder, I divide the sample into two groups: 
the treated group which includes rebate-eligible insureds, and a control group including non-
eligible ones. Rebates were actually determined at the end of the 2011, based on medical claims; 
however it was not determined until processing all the accounts which usually occurs about end 
of June of the following year. Therefore, even insureds that were eligible for 2011 rebates might 
lapse before rebate determination and distribution in July 2012. Thus, I can argue that the rebate 
is determined out of policyholder’s control and regardless of their characteristics16. Hence, the 
conditional independence assumption holds and I can consider differential changes in the lapse 
rate between treated and control groups as a causal effect of the rebate once I take into the 
account the effects of other covariates. Therefore, I pursue a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) 
strategy to identify the causal effect of the rebate eligibility on lapse rate by estimating Equation 
below: 
                                                                                      
Here, I estimate the likelihood of the lapse (0 or 1) for a policy i in a time period of t that is 
simply before or after the policy implementation (Lapseit) as a function of a matrix of the 
demographics    , state fixed effects of Si, a dummy variable of     for whether or not the 
policyholder is in treated group (equals one for policies eligible for the rebate), and a dummy 
variable     for after-change period (equals one for months after rebate distribution, i.e. on or 
after July 2012). Finally, interaction term of     and     will show the policy effect since it 
would be one only for treated policies (subject to the rebate) and after the change period. Hence, 
                                         
16
 Like any semi-randomized experiment, however, there might be some correlations between treatment assignment 
and covariates. I will try to minimize selection biases by using propensity score matching later.  
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 could be interpreted as the effect of the rebate eligibility on changing the probability of lapse 
in the treated group, or more explicitly, the causal effect of the rebate eligibility on the lapse 
behavior.  
Equation (3) above is a binary estimation –         is zero or one, so I can use a non-linear 
binary estimation model like a Probit or Logit model. However, interpreting the magnitude and 
significance of the interaction terms in non-linear models is controversial (Ai and Norton, 2003, 
Norton et al., 2004, and Karaca-Mandic et al., 2012) and requires more complicated approaches 
(Norton et al., 2004). Instead, I employ an OLS approach, like what has been done by Abrevaya 
and Hamermesh (2012) and Currie and Gruber (1996), in parallel with the Logit model. Only 
results from the OLS model are presented here but they are all consistent with Logit outputs in 
terms of the sign and significance.  
 
3.3.3. Data preparation   
From January through October 2012, there were 140,702 policies in the sample, some of 
which were active in only part of the time frame. This is shown in Figure 4 below. Even if a 
policy was initiated after January 2012, I do not exclude it from sample as long as it meets the 
criteria for the after-change period. I will explain about this later when I group observations into 
before and after change samples. 
July 2012 was the date that rebate-eligible policies were aware of their eligibility and 
received their checks in the mail. So, I divided the time frame into “Before” (before July) and 
“After” (on or after July) time periods as follows: Any policy initiated on or before January 2012 
would be in “Before” group. I keep looking at those policies in the January-April window to see 
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who lapses within these four months. Any policy initiated on or before July 2012 would be in 
“After” group. I follow them as well in the July-October window of to see lapses. I chose same 
time window for both groups to make them as much as comparable. Therefore, it is possible for a 
policy to be in both groups since some policies like #2, #3, and #140,702 have been active at the 
starting time of either period. On the other hand, some policies are only in one time window, and 
some are in neither. 
Figure 4- Available information for Jan-Oct of 2012; treated (rebate eligible) policies are 
shown in bold 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 5, I have 4 policies in “Before” period (#1, #2, #3, and #140,702), 3 of whom are 
treated (rebate eligible, or bold); one of those, #1, has lapsed before end of the period. On the 
other hand, there are 5 policies in after period (#2, #3, #4, #5, and #140,702), 2 of whom were 
rebate eligible (treated or bold). Among those 5, one treated policy and one control policy have 
lapsed within the four months time window, #3 and #5. Note that some policies are in neither 
before nor after time windows, like #140,701.  
Once I remove policies initiated and ended in February-June window, and policies initiated 
after July, 8,716 policies disappear, leaving 131,986 policies in the original dataset. Now, once I 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep  Oct 
      1 
      2 
      3 
      . 
Policy #      . 
      . 
140,701 
140,702 
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use the criteria to split the sample into “Before” and “After” groups, 124,782 policies sit in the 
“Before” subsample, while 108,121 policies are located in after subsample, with 100,917 
policies shared between two subsamples. I stacked up these two subsamples to end up with 
232,903 observations in the sample for DiD regressions.  
Figure 5- Dividing observations to before/after periods, treated/control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for “Before” and “After” subsamples, for both treated 
and control groups. 
Obviously, treated group shows lower lapse rate after policy implementation while it had a 
little higher lapse rate before change. This is a clue for positive effect of the rebate policy on 
retention. However, treated group has longer duration (over 13 months), is more likely subject to 
price and underwriting ratings, and it includes older people. These all suggest that treated people 
that were eligible for rebate are more likely older and unhealthier insureds on average, which 
means that they are subject to higher premiums and more expensive plans. One necessary 
condition for DiD strategy is to have common trend before the treatment. Panel (a) of Figure 6 
shows the lapse trend for both treated and control groups for before/after change period. 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep  Oct 
      1 
      2 
      3 
      4 
Policy #      5 
       . 
140,701 
140,702 
before after 
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Although trends before rebate distribution look very similar, I will try to make groups even more 
similar later when I try to match observations from control group to ones from treated group, 
based on propensity scores, in order to reduce possible selection biases.  
Table 4- Summary statistics of the sample for DiD regressions,  
for before/after and treated/control groups 
Characteristic 
Counts and Averages 
for Before (Jan - Apr) 
Counts and Averages 
for After (Jul - Oct) 
Treated  
(Rebate elig.) 
Control 
(Rebate non-
elig.) 
Treated  
(Rebate elig.) 
Control 
(Rebate non-
elig.) 
# Policies 44,756 80,026 35,867 72,254 
Lapse Rate (%) 12.36 12.13 10.08 11.41 
FY_ind (% with one year or less duration) 19.24 26.58 9.05 29.21 
Rn_on_ind (% with renewal took place) 44.69 36.78 49.34 31.50 
Preferred_ind (% with Preferred Rating) 35.64 35.41 35.29 35.88 
Rating_ind (% with Price Rating) 19.17 12.69 18.91 12.43 
Adverse_action_ind (% with 
Underwriting Rating) 
29.84 21.37 29.91 21.23 
Integrated_ind (% with Integration 
Indicator) 
5.79 7.43 5.56 10.14 
# Lives under policy 1.81 1.74 1.80 1.74 
Age of primary policyholder 45.66 44.41 46.38 44.63 
Final rebate amount ($‘000) 0.299 0 0.303 0 
Duration @ beginning (months) 49.63 36.18 57.65 38.34 
 
Indeed, I am trying to evaluate the significance of the delta (Δ) shown in panel (a) of Figure 
6, which shows deviation from common trend we have observed in before-change period. Of 
course, delta shown in Figure 6 is just for last month of after period while regressions reveal 
overall deviation from common trend for treated group during after period. A simple calculation 
from Table 4 reveals that while control group has shown about 0.7 percentage point lower lapse 
rate after policy implementation, treated group has shown about 2.3 percentage point decrease in 
lapse rate, meaning that rebate has decreased the lapse rate by about 1.6 percentage point, which 
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could be interpreted roughly as causal effect of the rebate. However, I should capture the effects 
of other covariates first, to end up with more reliable causal effect of the rebate.   
Figure 6- Lapse ratio trend for treated versus control group for before/after rebate 
distribution 
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3.3.4. Matching based on propensity scores  
Now, I go back to the question that how comparable are treated and control groups in terms 
of backgrounds prior to the experiment? Table 4 showed that although treated and control groups 
are very similar to each other in many aspects, there might be concerns about selection biases 
raised from the fact that less healthy people are more likely rebate eligible; but we know that 
they lapse less, too. In order to verify common trend for treated and control groups, I employ a 
propensity score matching based on most important characteristics of the treated group, like age, 
duration, channel, product type, policy class, and rating determinants, in order to address this 
concern.  
In the first step, to match observations, I regress the likelihood of the treatment (rebate 
indicator as dependent variable) on above independent variables. Since I do not have a panel 
data set, I do this separately for before and after periods. Then, I pick the observation in the 
control group with nearest propensity score for any one of the observations in the treated group 
and delete that observation from the potential control group.  I then continue matching for rest of 
the treated observations. 
Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the matched couples. Now treated and control 
groups sound more similar for either before and after periods. However, as panel (b) of Figure 6 
shows, the common trend has not changed in comparison to the base case in panel (a). Once I 
include state dummies in the matching procedure, however, similar trend is clearly visible, as 
shown in panel (c) of Figure 6. The only issue for this last matching is that since no rebate was 
paid in several states, I will lose more than half of the observations.  
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Table 5 shows that while reduction in lapse rate in treated group is about 2.29 percentage 
point after the policy change, lapse has decreased by about 1.05 percentage point for matched 
control. Therefore, rebate shows effective to keep policyholders by about 1.24 percentage point 
lower lapse rate. I should take into the account the effects of other covariates and trends, 
however. Thus, in second step, I do OLS regressions using only matched observations from 
control and treated groups.  
Table 5- Summary statistics of the sample for DiD regressions after 1:1 matching,  
for before/after and treated/control groups 
Characteristic 
Counts and Averages 
for Before (Jan - Apr) 
Counts and Averages 
for After (Jul - Oct) 
Treated  
(Rebate elig.) 
Control 
(Rebate non-
elig.) 
Treated  
(Rebate elig.) 
Control 
(Rebate non-
elig.) 
# Policies 44,688 44,688 35,810 35,810 
Lapse Rate (%) 12.37 11.97 10.08 10.92 
FY_ind (% with one year or less duration) 19.14 27.04 8.93 21.44 
Rn_on_ind (% with renewal took place) 44.74 43.60 49.29 46.90 
Preferred_ind (% with Preferred Rating) 35.65 38.76 35.30 38.02 
Rating_ind (% with Price Rating) 19.18 17.17 18.92 17.58 
Adverse_action_ind (% with 
Underwriting Rating) 
29.84 27.50 29.92 28.19 
Integrated_ind (% with Integration 
Indicator) 
5.79 5.56 5.57 4.65 
# Lives under policy 1.81 1.84 1.80 1.82 
Age of primary policyholder 45.66 44.94 46.37 45.79 
Final rebate amount ($‘000) 0.299 0 0.303 0 
Duration @ beginning (months) 49.64 41.73 57.69 48.70 
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3.4. Results and discussion 
 
3.4.1. Effect of the Rebate  
 Table 6 below shows the estimated effect of the rebate eligibility on the lapse rate, or one 
minus the retention rate, using OLS regression. Model (1) shows estimated coefficients for DiD 
regressions, which reveals the positive effect of the rebate on the retention after taking into the 
account the similar trends shared between eligible and non-eligible insureds for the rebate.  
While the indicator for rebate (or treatment indicator) shows positive effect on lapse, 
coefficient for after treatment is insignificantly negative, meaning that lapse in July-October 
period was insignificantly lower than lapse in January-April period. Most importantly, DiD 
interaction coefficient –which shows the coincidence of rebate eligibility and after period– has s 
significant negative impact on the lapse. The size of the coefficient is -0.017, which means that 
rebate has decreased the likelihood of the lapse by 1.7 percentage points for those eligible for 
rebate, after capturing the effects of covariates and taking the common trends of treated and 
control groups into account. This estimated impact is close to the rough estimation of 1.6 
percentage point from Table 4.  
Model (2) in Table 6 shows estimated coefficients for DiD regressions after matching. 
Rebate’s impact is now smaller in magnitude than what was in model (1), and it becomes 
marginally significant, with p-values of 0.12. Like before, estimated marginal effect of -1.3 
percentage point is very close to drop of 1.24 percentage point observed in Table 5. 
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Again, note that no insured was aware of the rebate eligibility prior to rebate distribution in 
June and July of 2012; hence, this differential in the lapse could be interpreted as the negative 
causal effect of the rebate on lapse. 
In model (2), indeed, clustered standard errors within states makes the DiD coefficient 
marginally significant, at 88-89% confidence interval. In other words, if I use simple or even 
robust standard errors instead of clustered standard errors, the coefficient becomes significant at 
99% confidence interval while it has the same magnitude. There might be several reasons behind 
this. Correlations between regressors and errors within cluster, or same sign regressor–error 
correlations within clusters are the important ones, as described by Cameron and Miller (2013). 
They indicated that the last one is the usual reason for bigger clustered standard errors for DiD 
regressions.
17
 In our case, since observations in a cluster –state– have very close backgrounds, at 
least in terms of the type of product, policy class, and channel, it is expected to see same sign 
correlations when we do the regression over all observations regardless of cluster. As I 
mentioned, however, the impact is still negative and marginally significant. 
  
                                         
17
 For detailed discussion and proofs see Cameron and Miller “A Practitioner's Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference”, 
October 15, 2013. 
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Table 6- Results of OLS regressions for lapse (0 or 1) on demographics, state dummies, and 
DiD variable (SE in parentheses) 
 
DiD model 
DiD model 
after 1:1 
matching 
DiD model after 
1:1 matching  
(incl. state dummies) 
Model # (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.173 0.153 0.441*** (5.875) (6.523) (0.055) 
Gender  ( = F) 
-0.001 -0.003 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
# of lives 
0.002 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duration @ beginning (month) 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rebate Amount ($‘000) 
0.002 0.006 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Rebate eligibility ( = 1) 
0.029*** 0.036*** 0.055*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
After period (Jul-Oct = 1) 
-0.003 -0.006 0.031*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
DiD -0.017** -0.013 -0.035*** 
(Treated and After Change = 1) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
No. of observations 232,328 160,996 64,860 
R
2
 0.011 0.012 0.012 
Note: a. Model 1: Naïve regression using all policies initiated on or before January 2012, clustered for 
observations within same states.  
Model 2: Difference-in-Difference (DiD) model, with clustered standard errors within states. Jan-
Apr window is considered as before change period, and Jul-Oct as after change period. So, any 
policy initiated on or before January 2012 is considered in before period, and any policy initiated 
on or before July 2012 is considered in after period.  
Model 3-4: DiD regression after matching one eligible policy to the nearest control policy (non-
eligible) in terms of characteristics, with clustered standard errors within states. Matching is done 
for before and after periods separately. In model 4, state dummies are included in propensity score 
matching process. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, channel, product type, policy 
class, different rating factors, and frequency of the rebate in the state of residence.  
c. 
*
 p < 0.10 , 
**
 p < 0.05 , 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
Another way to approach the matching procedure is to consider state dummies in matching. 
However, since rebate eligibility strongly depends on the state dummies – such that rebate was 
paid to all insureds in some states or no one received the rebate in some other states – this 
removes insureds of many states from the sample. In fact, less than half of the states here include 
 52 
 
both eligible and non-eligible insureds for rebate. Thus, I lose about 60% of observations by 
including state dummies within matching variables.  On the other hand, I can argue that this 
reveals the impact of the rebate on retention much better due to closer similarity of the treated 
and control insureds. Model (3) in Table 6 shows results of this approach. Now, the impact is 
much stronger than what observed in model (1) and (2). Model (3) shows that while lapse had 
been more frequent in after period (July – October), those eligible for rebate have shown much 
less lapses.
18
  
  
3.4.2. Effect of market concentration 
It was mentioned in section 3.2 that due to fewer numbers of alternatives in more 
concentrated health insurance markets, rebate would be expected to show a stronger impact on 
lapse rate. However, major obstacle to estimate the effect of the market concentration on lapse 
behavior is the data limitation. There is almost no data about market concentration for detailed 
segments of the market like counties or zip codes. Also, since health insurance, like many other 
services, is a network service which might be delivered in close but not exactly same 
neighborhood, a wider geographical region should be considered to measure the rate of 
competition in the market. Here, I gather the data regarding competition rate in the individual 
medical insurance market for each of 50 states and District of Columbia from Kaiser Family 
Foundation in the first three columns of the Table 7 below.    
                                         
18
 Summary statistics which are not shown here indicate that while treated group lowered the lapse rate from 12.83% 
to 12.10%, matched control group has experienced increase in lapse rate from 8.3% to 11.16%, a rough causal effect 
of about 3.6 percentage point decrease in lapse for rebate, but very close to -3.5% found in Table 6.  
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While it is possible to use either of the three concentration measures in Table 7, I chose the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) since it contains information about both number of insurers 
and their market shares. Also, the remained of Table 7 shows how I have estimated the rebate 
frequency for IM insurance policies in each of 50 states and District of Columbia, based on 
information from the Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) report. 
Similar to the concentration in the market, I have one number – rebate frequency – for each state. 
I will use this measure in the next section. Before talking about results, however, I should note 
that there are some important issues that should be considered before statistical analyses: First, 
market concentration and rebate frequency are measured at the state level, and therefore, have 
correlations with state dummies. Also, these two measures are correlated with each other which 
calls for more cautious in interpreting the results. I show and address both issues below.  
Having state-level measures of market concentration and rebate frequency results in 
impossible estimation for effect of these covariates in presence of the state dummies due to 
collinearity. Therefore, at least one state dummy should be dropped in order to include each of 
these measures in the results.  
On the other hand, most of the states with high rebate frequency are more competitive as 
well; for example, they have 4 or more insurers with over 5% market share or lower HHI, as 
Table 7 indicates. This means that states with less frequently paid rebate were on average less 
competitive, too. This sounds reasonable since health insurance markets are regulated such that 
market regulation and competition are negatively correlated. Figure 7 shows scatter plot of the 
number of insurers with 5+ percent market share and rebate frequency derived in Table 7. I 
found a correlation coefficient of 0.55 between the dummy variable for 20% or more rebate 
frequency (high_freq = 1 if rebate frequency >= 20%) and dummy variable for 4 or more 
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insurers with 5+ percent market share (comp = 1 if N >= 4). There is similar negative 
relationship between HHI and rebate frequency. 
Due to mentioned issues, especially the interactions with state dummies, I did not include 
market concentration and rebate frequency variables in the regressions of Table 6. Instead, I split 
the sample to subsamples according to the variable of interest –market concentration or rebate 
frequency, to see how rebate has influenced the lapse behavior among different subsamples. This 
is the way to observe difference-in-difference-in-difference (DiDiD) effect of the rebate, i.e. 
difference in the causal effect among different segments of population affected in comparison to 
their peers. If I had not had these issues, I might be able to include dummies like comp and 
high_freq mentioned above, and their interaction with DiD variable in order to have DiDiD 
coefficients.  
Table 8 shows the different causal effects among different subsamples, after matching 
observations and with clustered standard errors –similar to model (2) in Table 6– using OLS 
regressions. Comparing models (5-1) and (5-2) reveals that causal effect of the rebate on lapse is 
significantly negative in less competitive markets, while it is insignificantly positive for more 
competitive markets. This is exactly what was predicted. Model (5-2) in Table 8 shows 3 
percentage point reduction in lapse rate in less competitive markets while lapse rate has not 
changed significantly in more competitive markets. In splitting the sample, I included markets 
with HHI of 2500 or under in more competitive subsample and those with HHI of greater than 
2500 in less competitive subsample. This is partially due to sample size considerations, but also 
in the line with Federal Trade Commission (FTC) guidelines. 
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Figure 7- Positive Correlation between market competition and rebate frequency 
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6 
Table 7- Individual Medical (IM) insurance market concentration, and rebate frequency in the U.S. and in different states  
Market/ 
State 
Individual Medical Insurance 
Concentration, 2012
* Individual Medical Insurance characteristics and Rebate Status 
Herfindahl 
Hirschman 
Index (HHI) 
Market share 
of the largest 
insurer 
# of insurers 
with market 
share >= 5 % 
Total IM 
Rebate  
($ million)
 **
 
# IM 
Enrollees Got 
Rebates
**
 
Avg 
Rebate 
per 
Family
**
 
Population, 
July 01, 2012 
(million)
*** 
Privately Insured, 
 other than 
through 
employer
**** 
Rebate 
Frequency 
in IM 
market 
US N/A N/A N/A 393.88 4,122,682 $152 313.91 6% 21.89% 
Alabama 8213 90% 2 3.19 8,718 $582 4.82 5% 3.62% 
Alaska 3810 60% 5 0.00 0 $0 0.73 6% 0.00% 
Arizona 3169 50% 5 12.69 218,153 $97 6.55 5% 66.58% 
Arkansas 6499 80% 3 0.53 12,406 $75 2.95 7% 6.01% 
California 3052 47% 3 20.51 956,514 $30 38.04 7% 35.92% 
Colorado 1731 34% 7 3.06 109,460 $44 5.19 9% 23.44% 
Connecticut 2962 45% 4 3.99 47,990 $124 3.59 5% 26.73% 
Delaware 3068 49% 4 0.96 2,948 $461 0.92 4% 8.04% 
D.C. 5170 70% 3 0.15 1,908 $103 0.63 9% 3.35% 
Florida 2771 48% 5 47.26 308,944 $240 19.32 5% 31.99% 
Georgia 2334 40% 4 2.89 85,442 $51 9.92 6% 14.36% 
Hawaii 4805 52% 2 0.00 0 $0 1.39 4% 0.00% 
Idaho 3401 45% 3 0.14 1,083 $323 1.60 9% 0.75% 
Illinois 4637 67% 3 7.79 60,787 $199 12.88 8% 5.90% 
Indiana 4077 61% 3 2.84 42,320 $128 6.54 6% 10.79% 
Iowa 4712 64% 2 0.00 0 $0 3.07 7% 0.00% 
Kansas 2511 42% 5 3.54 54,763 $101 2.89 8% 23.72% 
Kentucky 6643 80% 2 0.23 2,830 $150 4.38 4% 1.62% 
Louisiana 5564 74% 3 2.86 23,866 $193 4.60 7% 7.41% 
Maine 3854 49% 3 0.00 0 $0 1.33 5% 0.00% 
Maryland 4727 66% 2 12.10 38,696 $496 5.88 7% 9.39% 
Massachusetts 2454 40% 5 0.23 2,487 $116 6.65 7% 0.53% 
Michigan 3178 52% 3 11.87 99,919 $205 9.88 5% 20.22% 
Minnesota 3999 59% 4 0.49 30,512 $38 5.38 9% 6.30% 
Mississippi 3981 59% 3 6.13 15,789 $651 2.98 5% 10.58% 
Missouri 2014 33% 5 16.33 181,007 $139 6.02 7% 42.94% 
Montana 4407 62% 3 1.69 16,825 $203 1.01 7% 23.91% 
Nebraska 4907 68% 3 3.70 29,827 $267 1.86 10% 16.07% 
Nevada 3198 44% 3 0.72 9,744 $115 2.76 6% 5.89% 
New 
Hampshire 
6596 80% 3 0.00 0 $0 1.32 6% 0.00% 
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New Jersey 5381 71% 3 0.11 4,430 $25 8.86 4% 1.25% 
New Mexico 3873 49% 2 0.00 0 $0 2.09 5% 0.00% 
New York 1641 28% 5 6.05 83,541 $90 19.57 6% 7.11% 
North 
Carolina 
7217 85% 1 3.11 26,185 $218 9.75 6% 4.48% 
North Dakota 5800 75% 3 0.01 4,229 $5 0.70 11% 5.50% 
Ohio 2677 36% 3 8.20 130,898 $106 11.54 6% 18.90% 
Oklahoma 4279 63% 3 6.60 104,568 $110 3.81 6% 45.68% 
Oregon 1841 33% 6 2.63 13,528 $360 3.90 6% 5.78% 
Pennsylvania 1949 35% 6 20.68 133,264 $238 12.76 6% 17.40% 
Rhode Island 8824 94% 1 0.00 0 $0 1.05 9% 0.00% 
South 
Carolina 
3678 57% 3 15.28 105,043 $227 4.72 4% 55.59% 
South Dakota 5582 74% 3 0.05 1,370 $68 0.83 11% 1.49% 
Tennessee 2793 38% 4 18.45 140,962 $207 6.46 5% 43.67% 
Texas 3682 59% 4 134.48 657,993 $356 26.06 5% 50.50% 
Utah 2927 41% 4 2.74 47,358 $145 2.86 8% 20.73% 
Vermont 8114 90% 2 0.00 0 $0 0.63 6% 0.00% 
Virginia 5816 76% 3 5.01 265,149 $32 8.19 6% 53.99% 
Washington 3230 40% 3 0.43 4,939 $161 6.90 7% 1.02% 
West Virginia 4207 61% 3 2.27 10,305 $383 1.86 4% 13.89% 
Wisconsin 1524 25% 5 0.65 19,759 $63 5.73 5% 6.90% 
Wyoming 2141 38% 4 0.93 5,201 $356 0.58 5% 18.05% 
Sources: 
*
 Kaiser Family Foundation: State Health Facts: Individual Insurance Market Competition. KFF has disclosed that this table took from analysis of 
Public Use File of Submissions of 2012 Medical Loss Ratio Annual Reporting Data (as of August 1, 2013) Available from the Center for Consumer 
Information & Insurance Oversight (CCIIO). 
**
 The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight (CCIIO), “The 80/20 Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to Millions of Consumers”, 
June 21, 2012; except other sources mentioned below. Last column is calculated by (# rebate precipitants) / (Privately Insured × Population), in 
percentage. 
***
 US Census Bureau, Annual Population Estimates, July 1, 2012. 
****
 Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts, Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population. 
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Table 8- Results of OLS regressions for lapse (0 or 1) for different subsamples based on market concentration, rebate frequency, 
and rebate amount (SE in parentheses) 
 
DiD model after 
1:1 matching 
DiDiD for Market 
Concentration 
DiDiD for Rebate 
Frequency in market 
DiDiD with 
 HHI and 
Reb_Freq 
DiDiD for Rebate Amount 
 
Model (2)  
(from Table 6) 
HHI<=2500 HHI>2500 RF >= 25% RF < 25% RA >= $300 RA < $300 
Model # (5-1) (5-2) (6-1) (6-2) (7) (8-1) (8-2) 
Intercept 0.153 0.039 0.176 0.254*** 0.234*** 0.145 0.130 0.088*** (6.523) (0.088) (10.208) (0.060) (0.111) (5.358) (23.531) (0.028) 
Gender  ( = F) 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.005* -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
# of lives 
0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.005** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duration @ beginning 
(month) 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rebate Amount ($‘000) 
0.006 0.257*** 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.003 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.036) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.025) 
Rebate eligibility ( = 1) 
0.036*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.052** 0.025*** 0.034*** 0.023 0.035*** 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.004) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) 
After period (Jul-Oct = 1) 
-0.006 -0.004 0.007 0.014 -0.011*** -0.006 -0.014*** -0.002 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
DiD -0.013 0.002 -0.030**  -0.030 0.001 0.002 -0.021** -0.010 
(Treated and After Change = 1) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) 
Concentrated (=1 if HHI > 
2500) 
 
  
  0.011***   
 
  
  (0.001)   
High Reb_Freq (=1 if RF 
>=25%) 
 
  
  -0.018***   
 
  
  (0.006)   
Conc. × DiD   
    -0.014***   
 
 
    (0.004)   
HRF × DiD 
 
 
    -0.005   
       (0.007)   
No. of observations 160,996 26,669 134,120 62,164 58,682 160,996 51,796 91,097 
R
2 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.012 
Note: a. Models 3 and 7: DiD regression after matching one eligible policy to the nearest control policy (non-eligible) in terms of characteristics, with clustered 
standard errors within states. Matching is done for before and after periods separately. Other models: DiD regression after splitting the main sample 
into subsamples based on variable of interest, matching, and clustered standard errors within states. Matching is done for before and after periods 
separately for subsamples. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, channel, product type, policy class, different rating factors, and frequency of 
the rebate in the state of residence.  
c. 
*
 p < 0.10 , 
**
 p < 0.05 , 
***
 p < 0.01 
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3.4.3. Effect of rebate frequency 
A positive relationship between lapse and rebate frequency in the market was another 
expected results in section 3.2. Intuition was that once insured gets the rebate while a lot of 
similar policies did not, next rebate would be more likely from the same insurer than the other 
alternatives in coming year.  
Models (6-1) and (6-2) in Table 8 show that rebate has had marginally significant – with p-
value of 0.13 – to discourage insureds from lapse in markets with higher than 25% rebate 
frequency, while its impact was positive but insignificant in markets with lower than 25% rebate 
frequency; opposite of what expected. My explanation for this unexpected result is that it could 
be due to the correlation between rebate frequency and market competition. I showed positive 
correlation between market competition and rebate frequency. So, how is this possible to see 
lower lapse rates in both more concentrated markets (model (5-2) in Table 8) and markets with 
more rebates (model (6-1) in Table 8)? 
A closer look at Figure 7 reveals that some states are just on the border of market 
competition but with high lapse frequencies. This includes AZ, SC, TN, and TX, where HHIs are 
between 2,500 and 3,700 (means concentrated markets but very close to competitive ones) where 
more than 40% of the insureds received rebate. These outliers which include significant portion 
of the observations may drive the results in model (6-1) of Table 8 such that more rebates 
explain fewer lapses significantly.  
One possible way to see effect of each variable, keeping the other one constant, is to use both 
simultaneously in a regression. I avoided this approach at the beginning to avoid losing 
information inherent in state dummies.  
 
 
60 
 
Once two new dummy variables are included in the OLS model, one for states with HHI of 
greater than 2500 (Conc = 1 if HHI > 2500) and one for states with rebate frequency of greater 
than 25% (HRF = 1 if rebate frequency > 25%) and also their interactions with DiD variable, I 
get the results of model (7) in Table 8. They show that more concentration in the market has 
significantly negative impact on lapse while rebate frequency’s impact is negative but 
insignificant.  
 
3.4.4. Effect of rebate amount  
I expected to see lapse to decrease with bigger rebates. The better way to consider the effect 
of the rebate amount is to consider the ratio of the rebate to premium which is not available in 
our data set. Also, other variables like policy class or product type contain information regarding 
premiums, thus I have had included some components of the premium in the models. Most of 
models in tables above indicate insignificant effect for rebate amount. Once I divided the sample 
into two subsamples based on rebate amount, in models (8-1) and (8-2) of Table 8, rebate 
amount effectively drives the results. Where rebate was greater than $300 –model (8-1), it has 
significantly reduced the lapse, while its impact is negative but insignificant for rebates below 
$300.  
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3.5. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study is to figure out the causal effect of the rebates paid by health 
insurance companies on lapse behavior of the insureds. New regulations under ACA requiring 
insurers to achieve a minimum MLR or send a rebate to insured may change the retention 
behavior of the insureds.  
Using data from an insurance company for individual medical insurance policies, a DiD 
identification strategy showed that lapse rate was effectively reduced by the rebates. In order to 
obtain a valid causal inference from this methodology, I chased all policies issued on or before 
January 2012 for 4 months. Then, I did the same for policies issued on or before July 2012. Since 
rebates were determined and distributed in July 2012 and no one was aware of rebate eligibility 
prior to that date, any differential change in retention rate for after policy change period between 
eligible and non-eligible policies can be attributed as causal effect of the rebate, after capturing 
the effects of other covariates like state fixed effects or insured backgrounds.  
Matching observations based on their backgrounds, in order to check the robustness of the 
results, showed that rebate is still positively effective for retention purposes. 
 In order to examine the impacts of some other covariates whose effects are expected to 
influence rebate impact, I estimated the causal effect of the rebate on subsamples based on rebate 
amount, market competitiveness, and rebate frequency in the markets. First of all, rebate amount 
sounds important for retention; bigger rebates end up in lower lapse rates, as predicted. On the 
other hand, less competition in the market has reduced the lapse rate significantly.   
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With respect to the rebate frequency, there was no significant causal effect attributable to 
that. Main reason could be insufficient time to observe rebate popularity in the market.  
Based on the results, I can propose following policy implications: 
 Peace of mind in pricing: Assuming that market is not too much sensitive to change in 
prices and quality of the services –like network, discounts, etc. – are of importance as 
well, we may choose to overprice the products. Possible rebates in the future will show 
some kind of reputation. 
 State specific pricing: In states with fewer competitors, rebate seems more successful. 
The bad news, however, is that these states are generally more regulated and pricing is 
therefore less flexible. 
Once rebate policy becomes a usual practice for insurers over time, there would be a need to 
employ more complex theories to explain insureds’ behavior. For example, rebate could be seen 
as a signal from insurer –sender– towards insured –receiver– in a signaling game, like the role of 
the guaranties to transfer some information from sender –seller– to receiver –buyer. This is one 
possible extension of this current study where all or most insurers may choose to send rebates, 
even though that is not required by law, to show their reputation.  
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Appendix A 
 
Regression results for effect of the ACA on  
childhood immunization coverage in the U.S. 
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Table A1 – Poisson regression results for Count of Up-To-Date vaccines among 9 
recommended vaccines for children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances  
(SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.905*** 1.904*** 1.898*** 1.908*** 1.930*** 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.007* -0.012** -0.009 -0.009* -0.013* 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.002 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.336*** -0.279*** -0.319*** -0.218** -0.221** 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
                     (= No) 0 0 -0.004 0.001 0.003 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.018 -0.022 -0.018 -0.028* -0.012 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.033*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.014** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.023 -0.058 -0.043 -0.067 -0.048 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.009* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.015*** 0.011* 0.01 0.014** 0.012* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.003 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.002 0.01 -0.004 0.019 0.018 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.008*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Treated Dummy -0.097*** -0.134*** -0.153*** -0.041*** -0.089*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.01 0.012 0.006 0.014* 0.004 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
BIC 159510 88197 63813 87596 40603 
Goodness of Fit Chi-Sqr 19484 11732 8449 10730 5401 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for DTaP vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.488*** 2.411*** 2.432*** 2.495*** 2.025*** 
(0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.19) (0.38) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.152*** -0.244*** -0.195*** -0.162*** -0.273*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.819*** -0.776*** -0.806*** -0.804*** -0.787*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.210*** -0.134** -0.181*** -0.185*** -0.162*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -1.353*** -0.571 -0.686 -0.619 -0.428 
(0.36) (0.68) (0.68) (0.83) (0.68) 
                     (= No) -0.039 0.043 0.002 0.023 0.024 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.274** -0.308** -0.306** -0.275** -0.254* 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.241*** -0.262*** -0.294*** -0.219*** -0.259*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.150*** -0.192*** -0.203*** -0.186*** -0.151** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.142*** 0.196*** 0.210*** 0.177*** 0.189*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.107 -0.084 0.034 -0.171 -0.206 
(0.21) (0.30) (0.33) (0.32) (0.26) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.217*** -0.209*** -0.183** -0.237*** -0.237*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.174** 0.190** 0.218** 0.215*** 0.181** 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) -0.001 0.095 0.117 0.025 0.004 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.013 0.265 0.202 0.335 0.247 
(0.08) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) (0.18) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.06 0.029 0.041 -0.044 -0.063 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.023 0.054 0.004 0.066* 0.039 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Treated Dummy -1.017*** -1.140*** -1.319*** -0.892*** -0.586*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
After Change Dummy 0.103* 0.142** 0.185** 0.129** 0.227** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.152** 0.155* 0.072 0.202** 0.140 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,058 14,563 20,064 9,216 
BIC 24391 13930 10331 13411 6723 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.058 0.051 0.053 0.05 0.046 
Chi-Sqr 1672.66 909.271 729.106 843.439 443.811 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Hep A vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.532*** 0.348** 0.352** 0.223 0.180 
(0.19) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.143*** -0.186*** -0.150*** -0.201*** -0.200*** 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) 0.563*** 0.517*** 0.557*** 0.554*** 0.481*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.162*** -0.175*** -0.156*** -0.164*** -0.174*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.993** -1.622** -2.037*** -0.925 -0.955* 
(0.40) (0.67) (0.77) (0.62) (0.56) 
                     (= No) 0.022 0.04 0.009 0.039 0.006 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) 0.088 0.066 0.027 0.072 0.126 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.191*** -0.180*** -0.322*** -0.152**  -0.102*  
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.144*** -0.174*** -0.201*** -0.196*** -0.123*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.060** 0.052 0.051 0.073*   0.074**   
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.115 -0.362 -0.397 -0.446*   -0.282   
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.094** -0.107** -0.082 -0.095**  -0.094**  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.157*** 0.168*** 0.110* 0.184*** 0.194*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.06 0.114* 0.05 0.095 0.024 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.038 0.111 0.082 0.126 0.120 
(0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.138*** 0.168*** 0.126** 0.139*** 0.158*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.043* 0.056* 0.045 0.025 0.032 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Treated Dummy -0.840*** -1.217*** -1.401*** 0.106**  -1.014***  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
After Change Dummy 0.324*** 0.374*** 0.560*** 0.355*** 0.458*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.084 0.087 0.058 0.109 -0.035 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) 
No. of observations 36,648 20,058 14,563 20,064 9,216 
BIC 45478 25126 18457 24847 11989 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.068 0.059 0.061 0.058 0.049 
Chi-Sqr 3489.039 1728.534 1343.67 1650.121 735.423 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A4 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Hep B vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 3.861*** 3.636*** 3.728*** 3.824*** 2.839*** 
(0.41) (0.39) (0.43) (0.45) (0.58) 
First Born Child  (= No) 0.117 0.158* 0.144 0.165*   0.180*   
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.325*** -0.298*** -0.380*** -0.263*** -0.303*** 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.090* -0.039 -0.074 -0.053 -0.037 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -1.577*** -0.811 -0.913 -0.22 -0.769 
(0.42) (0.78) (0.79) (1.12) (0.80) 
                     (= No) 0.124 0.116 0.15 0.152 0.072 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.052 0.007 0.078 -0.163 -0.029 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.27) (0.17) (0.20) 
                          (= 12 Years) 0.08 -0.012 -0.049 -0.005 -0.035 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) 0.06 -0.012 -0.003 0.048 0.000 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.146*** 0.225*** 0.234*** 0.152*** 0.257*** 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) 0.109 -0.131 0.078 0.015 0.520 
(0.30) (0.49) (0.57) (0.56) (0.52) 
           (= 20-29 Years) 0.073 0.085 0.029 0.006 0.206* 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.073 -0.006 -0.035 0.006 0.026 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.225** 0.142**  0.207**  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.243** 0.135 -0.037 0.203 0.222* 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.133* 0.118 0.076 0.055 0.037 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.05 0.062 0.03 0.094*   0.124**   
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Treated Dummy -0.834*** -0.960*** -1.173*** -0.853*** -0.436*** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
After Change Dummy -0.328*** -0.309*** -0.168*** -0.294*** -0.159 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
-0.003 0.039 0.052 -0.001 -0.111 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,058 14,563 20,064 9,216 
BIC 17600 10136 6902 9878 4645 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.053 0.048 0.046 0.042 0.038 
Chi-Sqr 1138.883 669.341 484.737 564.292 304.117 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A5 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Hib vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.625*** 1.635*** 1.570*** 1.759*** 2.778*** 
(0.43) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.47) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.066 -0.034 -0.028 0.021 0.024 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.590*** -0.517*** -0.636*** -0.568*** -0.511*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.283*** -0.198*** -0.276*** -0.230*** -0.235*** 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -2.855*** -2.675*** -2.914*** -2.759*** -2.654*** 
(0.36) (0.46) (0.48) (0.50) (0.45) 
                     (= No) -0.101 -0.140* -0.176* -0.121 -0.098 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.016 -0.042 0.118 0.011 0.139 
(0.15) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) 
                          (= 12 Years) 0.045 0.132 0.108 0.129 0.124 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) 0.038 0.036 0.052 -0.001 0.040 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.095*** 0.107** 0.132** 0.108**  0.166**  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.313 -0.656* -0.531 -0.467 -0.475 
(0.31) (0.35) (0.37) (0.41) (0.42) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.162*** -0.205*** -0.185** -0.121 -0.109 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.097 0.02 -0.004 0.038 0.075 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.055 0.092 0.131 0.11 0.068 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.059 0.098 -0.113 0.338*   0.203   
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.15) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.139* -0.096 -0.058 -0.13 -0.144 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.031 -0.008 -0.085 -0.001 0.006 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Treated Dummy -0.218*** -0.326*** -0.345*** 0.377*** -0.285*** 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
After Change Dummy 1.766*** 1.729*** 1.715*** 1.695*** 1.617*** 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.32) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.006 -0.229 -0.462 0.081 -0.201 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.31) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,058 14,563 20,064 9,216 
BIC 17957 10053 8360 9918 4786 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.111 0.091 0.086 0.096 0.089 
Chi-Sqr 2391.888 1153.252 933.181 1185.127 576.619 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A6 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for MCV vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.732*** 2.594*** 2.838*** 2.811*** 1.561*** 
(0.33) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27) (0.46) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.068 -0.115 -0.038 -0.05 -0.160* 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.604*** -0.544*** -0.539*** -0.567*** -0.604*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.127** -0.121 -0.093 -0.098 -0.118 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.582 -0.092 -0.165 -0.151 --- 
(0.55) (1.11) (1.09) (1.10) --- 
                     (= No) 0.223*** 0.172* 0.155 0.192**  0.192**  
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.126 -0.327* -0.365* -0.505*** 0.298 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.15) (0.20) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.203*** -0.183* -0.310** -0.225**  -0.110  
(0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.116* -0.148* -0.117 -0.174**  -0.126*  
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.119*** 0.114** 0.177*** 0.062 0.143*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.467* -0.38 -0.078 -0.330 -0.191 
(0.24) (0.40) (0.49) (0.42) (0.36) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.001 -0.122* -0.065 -0.125*   -0.048   
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.04 -0.025 -0.124 -0.002 -0.035 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.036 0.075 0.057 -0.001 -0.030 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.194 0.141 -0.094 0.313 0.251 
(0.14) (0.21) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.075 0.117 0.066 0.061 0.063 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.224*** 0.288*** 0.250*** 0.328*** 0.284*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Treated Dummy -0.941*** -1.143*** -1.366*** -0.867*** 0.099 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) 
After Change Dummy 0.001 0.017 -0.095 -0.008 -0.143 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.109 0.103 0.003 0.170 0.113 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.21) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,058 14,563 20,064 9,198 
BIC 16292 9370 6714 8972 4556 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.047 0.042 0.043 0.036 0.038 
Chi-Sqr 969.62 571.614 460.147 473.547 298.581 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A7 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for PCV vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.825*** 1.778*** 1.801*** 1.927*** 0.814*** 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.006 -0.029 0.014 -0.050 -0.077 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.313*** -0.306*** -0.309*** -0.320*** -0.321*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.071* -0.051 -0.054 -0.061 -0.063 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -2.731*** -3.066*** -3.413*** -2.389*** -2.406*** 
(0.34) (0.67) (0.64) (0.63) (0.53) 
                     (= No) -0.132*** -0.158*** -0.205*** -0.180*** -0.192*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.292*** -0.275** -0.288 -0.247*   -0.206   
(0.10) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.296*** -0.265*** -0.304*** -0.243*** -0.347*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.172*** -0.164*** -0.111** -0.144*** -0.143*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.144*** 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.164*** 0.191*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) 0.099 -0.368 -0.291 -0.376 -0.442 
(0.22) (0.31) (0.33) (0.34) (0.28) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.117*** -0.142*** -0.148** -0.114**  -0.080  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.075 0.047 0.041 0.089 0.053 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) -0.172*** -0.131* -0.171* -0.175**  -0.180**  
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.277*** -0.11 -0.161 -0.135 -0.109 
(0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.382*** -0.330*** -0.323*** -0.356*** -0.393*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.061** 0.074* 0.014 0.079*   0.029   
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Treated Dummy -1.174*** -1.169*** -1.228*** -0.983*** -0.066 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
After Change Dummy 0.339*** 0.378*** 0.273*** 0.375*** 0.323*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.045 0.038 0.011 0.019 -0.135 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,058 14,563 20,064 9,216 
BIC 26417 15215 11671 14643 7386 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.057 0.046 0.043 0.045 0.041 
Chi-Sqr 1744.51 897.571 681.716 829.225 435.745 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
 
 
75 
 
Table A8 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Polio vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 3.476*** 3.244*** 2.874*** 3.381*** 2.613*** 
(0.45) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40) (0.56) 
First Born Child  (= No) 0.077 0.056 0.031 0.023 -0.016 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.457*** -0.404*** -0.509*** -0.426*** -0.467*** 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.087 -0.046 -0.146 -0.094 -0.137* 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -1.237** -0.948 -1.042 -0.272 -0.909 
(0.49) (0.81) (0.84) (1.14) (0.83) 
                     (= No) 0.076 0.104 0.072 0.188 0.106 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.237 -0.152 -0.11 -0.174 -0.144 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.096 -0.136 -0.319*** -0.088 -0.153 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.02 -0.063 -0.092 -0.033 -0.077 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.136*** 0.172*** 0.212*** 0.134**  0.216**  
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.275 -0.478 -0.205 -0.734 -0.156 
(0.30) (0.43) (0.51) (0.45) (0.52) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.172** -0.205*** -0.219*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.167* 0.116 0.131 0.145 0.170 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.053 0.056 0.095 -0.008 0.053 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.263*** 0.394*** 0.127 0.556**  0.610**  
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.22) (0.17) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.014 -0.003 0.033 -0.088 -0.051 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.123*** 0.142** 0.051 0.192*** 0.154*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Treated Dummy -1.075*** -1.478*** -1.457*** -0.790*** -0.837*** 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
After Change Dummy 0.209** 0.236*** 0.321*** 0.192** 0.279* 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
-0.002 0.088 -0.133 0.139 0.042 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,058 14,563 20,064 9,216 
BIC 13349 8033 6018 7597 3758 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.058 0.048 0.051 0.043 0.047 
Chi-Sqr 984.125 562.073 476.177 477.041 301.574 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A9 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for ROT vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -1.236*** -1.220*** -1.307*** -1.417*** -1.413*** 
(0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.30) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.069* -0.075 -0.049 -0.050 -0.075 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) 1.026*** 0.990*** 1.235*** 1.011*** 0.995*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
                  (= 24-29 m) 0.450*** 0.434*** 0.517*** 0.424*** 0.453*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -4.187*** -2.511** 
 
-2.382**  -2.633**  
(1.07) (1.03) 
 
(1.04) (1.03) 
                     (= No) -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.102** -0.122*** -0.150*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.290*** -0.238* -0.251* -0.273*   -0.113   
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.201*** -0.228*** -0.385*** -0.256*** -0.251*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.103*** -0.138*** -0.129** -0.103**  -0.192***  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.148*** 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.191*** 0.185*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.038 -0.153 -0.179 -0.303 -0.085 
(0.28) (0.47) (0.51) (0.50) (0.43) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.126*** -0.138*** -0.091* -0.133*** -0.067 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.166*** 0.116* 0.167** 0.137**  0.089  
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) -0.024 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.036 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.193*** -0.004 -0.163 0.111 0.048 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.200*** -0.192*** -0.183*** -0.178*** -0.179*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.019 0.048 0.011 0.045 0.021 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Treated Dummy -0.533*** -0.641*** -0.796*** -0.189*** -0.401*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) 
After Change Dummy 1.066*** 1.066*** 1.146*** 1.074*** 1.012*** 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.137 0.109 0.126 0.103 0.059 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,058 14,546 20,064 9,216 
BIC 37872 21045 14917 21067 10114 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.257 0.247 0.26 0.244 0.219 
Chi-Sqr 13215.272 7000.67 5356.299 6898.574 2921.829 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A10 – Logistic regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for VRC vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.852*** 2.495*** 2.380*** 2.534*** 1.553*** 
(0.28) (0.24) (0.28) (0.27) (0.35) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.076 -0.151* -0.16 -0.091 -0.174* 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.386*** -0.383*** -0.428*** -0.444*** -0.403*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.058 0.009 -0.015 -0.061 0.008 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.485 --- --- --- --- 
(0.39) --- --- --- --- 
                     (= No) 0.209*** 0.173** 0.117 0.243*** 0.193** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) 0.052 -0.047 -0.072 -0.251 -0.105 
(0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.19) (0.23) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.068 -0.031 -0.068 -0.068 -0.080 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.032 -0.048 -0.004 -0.097 -0.102 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.155*** 0.141*** 0.138** 0.086 0.123** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.467** -0.698* -0.571 -0.764*   -0.512   
(0.20) (0.38) (0.44) (0.40) (0.35) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.065 -0.169*** -0.221*** -0.129*   -0.106   
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) -0.043 -0.114 -0.151 -0.057 -0.098 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.161** 0.157** 0.13 0.104 0.120* 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.088 -0.034 -0.172 0.133 0.110 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.20) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.05 0.072 0.017 0.025 0.074 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.092** 0.095* 0.065 0.148*** 0.134*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Treated Dummy -0.833*** -1.189*** -1.179*** -0.549*** -0.709*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
After Change Dummy -0.035 0.019 0.192 0.006 -0.071 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.199** 0.257** 0.235 0.262**  0.468***  
(0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) 
No. of observations 36,646 20,040 14,546 20,047 9,198 
BIC 20888 11388 8301 10887 5490 
McFadden_Adj_R2 0.039 0.033 0.033 0.027 0.034 
Chi-Sqr 1022.387 547.882 439.746 440.65 309.159 
Chi-Sqr’s p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A1ʹ – OLS regression results for Count of Up-To-Date vaccines among 9 
recommended vaccines for children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in 
parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 6.987*** -0.443*** -0.390*** 7.054*** -0.764*** 
(0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.056* -0.087** -0.067 -0.068* -0.108*   
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) 0.025 0.02 0.032 0.029 0.001 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.018 -0.001 -0.007 -0.01 -0.001 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -2.095*** -1.768*** -1.979*** -1.414** -1.690*** 
(0.36) (0.48) (0.42) (0.53) (0.54) 
                     (= No) -0.002 0.001 -0.029 0.004 -0.029 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.127 -0.158 -0.131 -0.198* -0.457**  
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.21) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.237*** -0.143*** -0.102 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.084*** -0.110*** -0.102** -0.106** -0.095**  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.123*** 0.145*** 0.157*** 0.129*** 0.159*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.16 -0.398 -0.289 -0.461 -0.281 
(0.16) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.45) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.093*** -0.120*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.099**  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.110*** 0.078* 0.068 0.101** 0.04 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.026 0.063 0.046 0.028 0.069 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.015 0.079 -0.03 0.144 0.097 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.047 -0.022 -0.032 -0.051 0.001 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.052*** 0.071*** 0.034 0.074*** 0.051 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Treated Dummy -0.722*** -0.962*** -1.094*** -0.300*** -0.613*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
After Change Dummy 0.446*** 0.470*** 0.560*** 0.677*** 0.660*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.074 0.079 0.032 0.107* 0.027 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.21  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.13  
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for DTaP vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.864*** 0.013 -0.005 0.928*** 0.013 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.012*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.034*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.079*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.017*** -0.011** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.009 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.188*** -0.058 -0.072 -0.064 -0.107 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) 
                     (= No) -0.003 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.008 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.034** -0.042** -0.040* -0.037* -0.106**  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.023*** -0.029*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020**  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.015 -0.013 0.004 -0.026 -0.014 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.019** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.020** 0.022** 0.026** 0.024** 0.009 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.001 0.01 0.012 0.003 0.012 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.001 0.028 0.022 0.032 0.009 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.005 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.007 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.007* 0.003 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Treated Dummy -0.097*** -0.120*** -0.142*** -0.322*** -0.078*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy 0.010* -0.004 0.020** -0.007 -0.001 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.013* 0.016* 0.008 0.019** 0.014 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Hep A vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.625*** -0.094** -0.031 0.504*** -0.259*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.033*** -0.043*** -0.039**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.026**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.215** -0.333*** -0.393*** -0.202 -0.226*   
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) 
                     (= No) 0.004 0.008 0.0001 0.008 0.003 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) 0.018 0.015 0.007 0.016 0.059 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.071*** -0.032** -0.014 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.017 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.013* 0.011 0.011 0.016* 0.018*   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.027 -0.078 -0.086 -0.099* -0.032 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.020** -0.023** -0.018 -0.020** -0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.024 0.039*** 0.03 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.012 0.023* 0.01 0.02 0.002 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.008 0.026 0.02 0.029 0.059 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.039**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.009* 0.013** 0.01 0.005 0.013*   
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated Dummy -0.193*** -0.280*** -0.320*** -0.038*** -0.053*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy 0.069*** 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.135*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.018 0.019 0.013 0.022 -0.011 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A4ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Hep B vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.925*** -0.001 -0.027 0.992*** -0.001 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
First Born Child  (= No) 0.006 0.010* 0.008 0.010* 0.01 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.017*** -0.026*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.005* -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.010*   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.170** -0.054 -0.063 -0.008 -0.064 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
                     (= No) 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.004 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.004 0.001 0.009 -0.012 -0.039 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
                          (= 12 Years) 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) 0.004 -0.016 -0.001 -0.009 0.008 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
           (= 20-29 Years) 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.008 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014** 0.010** 0.027*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.014** 0.007 -0.005 0.012 0.014 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.008 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.004 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Treated Dummy -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.128*** -0.041*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy -0.021*** -0.048*** -0.011* -0.047*** -0.040*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
 
 
82 
 
Table A5ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Hib vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.805*** -0.092*** -0.088*** 0.952*** 0.014 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.050*** -0.038*** -0.032*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.011 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.435*** -0.456*** -0.494*** -0.484*** -0.501*** 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
                     (= No) -0.008 -0.010* -0.016** -0.009 -0.017*   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.004 -0.008 0.011 -0.004 -0.069**  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                          (= 12 Years) 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.003 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.007 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.007** 0.008* 0.011** 0.007* 0.007 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.029 -0.073* -0.057 -0.053 -0.068 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.011** -0.014*** -0.014** -0.007 -0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.005 0.007 0.011* 0.007 0.011 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.003 0.008 -0.007 0.020** -0.009 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.009* -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Treated Dummy -0.019* -0.030*** -0.036*** 0.039*** -0.072*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.036*** 0.038**  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.003 -0.005 -0.017 0.011 -0.004 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.14 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A6ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for MCV vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.903*** 0.023 -0.005 0.980*** 0.018 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.040*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.006** -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.04 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 0.055*** 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) 
                     (= No) 0.012*** 0.010* 0.009 0.011** 0.013 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.008 -0.025 -0.026 -0.040*** -0.071**  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.012** -0.01 -0.019** -0.013* -0.004 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.006* -0.008 -0.006 -0.009* -0.009 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.009*** 0.008** 0.013** 0.004 0.010*   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.039* -0.033 -0.011 -0.029 -0.039 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
           (= 20-29 Years) 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.011 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.011 0.008 -0.006 0.016 0.005 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.007 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Treated Dummy -0.049*** -0.067*** -0.077*** -0.126*** -0.019*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy -0.001 -0.020*** 0.018** -0.020*** -0.031*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.009 0.007 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A7ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for PCV vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.808*** -0.042* -0.037 0.858*** -0.094*** 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
First Born Child  (= No) 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.044*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.007* -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.016**  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.541*** -0.622*** -0.670*** -0.489*** -0.576*** 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) 
                     (= No) -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.032*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.041*** -0.043** -0.047 -0.039* -0.06 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.041*** -0.030*** -0.028**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.012** -0.015** -0.013*   
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.034*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) 0.01 -0.064 -0.051 -0.065 -0.091 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.018** -0.012** -0.016**  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.01 0.005 0.005 0.01 -0.014 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) -0.018*** -0.014 -0.019* -0.018** -0.015 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.030*** -0.011 -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.042*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.006** 0.008* 0.002 0.009* 0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Treated Dummy -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.142*** -0.389*** -0.039*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.003 0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.016 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A8ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for Polio vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.919*** -0.001 -0.023 0.979*** 0.013 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
First Born Child  (= No) 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.090* -0.061 -0.07 -0.008 -0.062 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
                     (= No) 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.007 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.017 -0.012 -0.006 -0.014 -0.064**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.005 -0.007 -0.018** -0.005 -0.005 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.008** 0.007 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.02 -0.041 -0.02 -0.063 -0.033 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.008*** -0.009** -0.008* -0.009** -0.014**  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.009* 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.022**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.020*   
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.012*** 0.018** 0.005 0.022*** 0.024*   
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.005*** 0.007** 0.003 0.009*** 0.004 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Treated Dummy -0.043*** -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.236*** -0.059*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy 0.009** -0.004 0.016*** -0.005 -0.006 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
-0.001 0.004 -0.008 0.006 0.001 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A9ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for ROT vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.303*** -0.554*** -0.167*** -0.080** -0.521*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.012* -0.013* -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) 0.171*** 0.167*** 0.205*** 0.171*** 0.169*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.074*** 0.084*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.367*** -0.263*** -0.284*** -0.236** -0.290*** 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
                     (= No) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018** -0.021*** -0.032*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) -0.042** -0.040* -0.035 -0.046* -0.059*   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.058*** -0.042*** -0.018 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.016*** -0.022** -0.019* -0.016* -0.024**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) 0.002 -0.013 -0.014 -0.044 0.001 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.015* -0.022*** -0.004 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) 0.027*** 0.019* 0.027** 0.023** -0.004 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) -0.033** -0.002 -0.028 0.019 0.015 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.016 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.004 0.009* 0.002 0.008 -0.006 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated Dummy -0.093*** -0.113*** -0.135*** -0.026** -0.122*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
After Change Dummy 0.225*** 0.583*** 0.234*** 0.583*** 0.552*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.017 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.009 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.28 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Table A10ʹ – OLS regression results for Up-To-Date flag (0 or 1) for VRC vaccine among 
children aged 19-35 months covered by private insurances (SE in parentheses) 
 
Base model Alternative/Robustness check  models 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.835*** 0.008 -0.008 0.945*** 0.054 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
First Born Child  (= No) -0.005 -0.011* -0.012 -0.006 -0.013 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Age Group  (= 19-23 m) -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                  (= 24-29 m) -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Breast-fed Child   (= Don’t Know) -0.048 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                     (= No) 0.015*** 0.013** 0.009 0.016*** 0.018**  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Educ.   (< 12 Years) 0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.022 -0.048 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                          (= 12 Years) -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                          (> 12, No College Grad.) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.011 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income-to-Poverty Ratio 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.007 0.009 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother’s Age   (<= 19 Years) -0.045** -0.068 -0.054 -0.073 -0.012 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
           (= 20-29 Years) -0.005 -0.013** -0.017** -0.009* -0.011 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s Marital Stat. (= Married) -0.004 -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 -0.001 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethn. of Child (=Hispanic) 0.012** 0.012** 0.010* 0.007 0.007 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                               (= Non-His,Black Only) 0.006 -0.004 -0.013 0.008 -0.001 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
                               (= Non-His,Other,Mult.) 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.009 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child’s Gender   (= Female) 0.007** 0.007* 0.005 0.011** 0.013*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Treated Dummy -0.070*** -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.036*** -0.129*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
After Change Dummy -0.002 -0.014*** 0.015 -0.013** -0.026*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treated and After Change Dummy 
    
0.015** 0.020** 0.018* 0.019** 0.036*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of observations 36,896 20,122 14,610 20,122 9,236 
R
2 0.1 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Note: a. Models: (1) with fixed effect and all covariates, clustered standard errors for states. (2) same as (1) but after 
propensity score matching between treated and control groups, clustered for states. (3) same as (2) but only 2012 
for after change period (reducing grandfathered status impact). (4) same as (2) but after eliminating 10 states with 
Universal/Universal Select programs from treated group. (5) same as (2) but after eliminating 19 states with legal 
exception permissions from treated group. 
b. There are other variables in the models including: state dummy variables, number of providers responding the 
questionnaires, shot card usage, number of children, mobility of family, vaccine ordered from state, number of 
household members, and time dummy variables. 
c. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix B 
 
Revision of the regression results 
for interaction terms in Logit models (2) and (4) 
of Appendix A 
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Figure B1 – Revising magnitude and significance of the interaction term in model (2) of Logit 
regressions in Appendix A, by using inteff command in Stata  
(ie ≡ interaction effect, se ≡ standard errors for interaction effect, z ≡ z-stat for interaction effect) 
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Figure B2 – Revising magnitude and significance of the interaction term in model (4) of Logit 
regressions in Appendix A, by using inteff command in Stata  
(ie ≡ interaction effect, se ≡ standard errors for interaction effect, z ≡ z-stat for interaction effect) 
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